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STRUCTURAL CHANGES, STRATEGY DEBATE IN BUNDESWEHR

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 11/12 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Ch. M.: "NATO Forward Defense in Germany. Defense Concepts for the Bundeswehr. New Structure and Alternative Proposals"]

[Text] Four Leopard 2 main battle tanks grind forward over a sandy approach track of the North German military training area near Munster; moving at high speed, they open fire with their 120 mm cannons at targets approximately 1,800 meters distant. Direct hit follows direct hit, giving impressive support to the claim that this new tank, 1,800 of which are due to be assigned to the Bundeswehr, is more than just a further refinement of military technology: except for a passive thermal image receptor, already installed on the U.S. Abrams M-1 tank and soon to be part of the Leopard 2's technical array, this tank, with its stabilization, its computerized fire control system and its laser range finder as well as its special laminated armor and the fin-stabilized projectiles of its kinetic-energy ammunition can be ranked at the top of the latest currently available military technology. It embodies an intensification of firepower at the foremost line of resistance. It thereby makes it possible to decrease the size of present tank battalions from 54 to 41 tanks while increasing the number of combat units.

Smaller Units and Greater Mobility

Tighter "leadership distribution," greater facility of control and enhances mobility have been cited as the result of the restructuring made possible by the increase in conventional effectiveness which is now to be put into effect within the Bundeswehr under the designation "Army Structure 4." It will also affect armored infantry battalions, whose 50 Marder armored personnel carriers will be reduced in number to 34--without any accompanying increase in combat strength. The 17 armored and 15 armored infantry brigades will now be made up of four instead of the previous three combat battalions and the number of combat companies per battalion will increase from nine larger companies per battalion to 12 smaller ones. The newly added battalion, however, will normally be a somewhat theoretical one, being reduced to cadre strength: its headquarters and headquarters company will only be brought to strength upon mobilization, with its personnel drawn from the other three battalion staffs and from reservists. It is estimated

that some 120 men will thereby be released. The three combat companies of this "mixed" battalion, made up variously of armored and armored infantry troops depending upon the type of brigade, will in peacetime continue to be under the control of the three active duty battalion staffs as a fourth company.

This appears to be the other side of the coin of this restructuring, in which not only the adaptation of combat tactics to new developments in military technology was decisive, but also the need for economy. Some of its administrative consequences such as the manpower-thin concentration of logistical support at battalion level, while company size is being reduced, have aroused criticism at unit level. One or the other unit commander may go so far in his criticism of the trend toward centralization as to see a contradiction to the traditional German leadership concept of the task force which demands free decentralized initiative at every troop level. The grumbling is directed exclusively at the peacetime unit organization, where the theoretically desirable elimination of administrative and red-tape problems through reductions in personnel strength is still a long way from having been attained. The improvement of unit control in the event of an emergency, on the other hand, has drawn universal acclaim. The fact that now only the battalion and not the individual companies are assigned a motor transport NCO has been pretty much accepted.

Mobilization Instead of Active Duty Strength

Under "Army Structure 4" the German Army will continue at the level of three corps and 12 divisions. The number of combat brigades, with an additional three armored brigades, has been increased to a total of 36. These brigades, all assigned to NATO command, have a high active duty personnel strength of 87 percent; while units assigned directly to a corps have a peacetime strength of only 46 percent and those assigned to divisions maintain 51 percent. Cadrification is fairly far advanced with these units. Official thinking holds that not a great deal more can be done in this direction without risking weakening of the army's combat strength. One possibility for the future is that, for a variety of reasons, the old motto, "active duty strength is everything," may be replaced by increased emphasis on and development of the capability of mobilizing the entire Bundeswehr at a strength of 1.2 million men in case of emergency, without what has now become much maligned under the heading of "cadrification." This would mean more brigades, so organized as to serve as vehicles for quickly mobilizable reserves.

Such considerations are only likely to be ready for discussion after a few years. Until then the result of "Army Structure 4" will remain in force. Among the changes introduced are the assignment of three army aviation regiments with antitank helicopters at corps level as well as the reorganization of an antiaircraft regiment with the Roland missile system assigned to each corps. The divisions are to receive antiaircraft armored vehicle Gepard in regimental strength and further, as an augmentation of its infantry capability, two light infantry battalions. With the exception of the 6th Armored Infantry Division in Schleswig-Holstein, which already is assigned its own squadron of antitank helicopters and two reduced-strength light infantry battalions, these light infantry units will, during peacetime, only exist on paper as TE [equipment only] units.

New Emphasis on the Territorial Army

The Territorial Army will follow a similar pattern, even though some of the most significant changes under "Army Structure 4" will take place in this area. Six of the newly formed 12 home defense brigades will remain purely TE units. The other six, however, which are to be assigned at various command levels within NATO, are now for the first time to be equipped as combat brigades, similar to armored infantry, though with older equipment. One of them has an active duty strength of 85 percent, three are at 65 percent of authorized strength and two at 52 percent. This means, at least in organizational terms, a conventional increase in Bundeswehr strength to 42 brigades. The Territorial Army, which is assigned the duty of securing NATO's rear area in the event of emergency with all its regiments, battalions, companies and platoons, has until now been in somewhat bad odor as a shadow reserve force where overage, sidetracked officers could find a warm place. At the infantry combat school at Hammelburg, where training courses for Territorial Army unit leaders are now conducted, assurances are given that there will soon be an end to this kind of thinking. Nevertheless, equipment for these units is requisitioned at second hand from the Field Army. In addition, there are widespread problems involved in the retaining of the reserves. The more extensive cadrification of units in both the Territorial and Field Armies has brought about a generally higher number of reservists and reserve training courses in all of these partial strength units. In the future in the Army alone, 210,000 reservists instead of a present 130,000 are scheduled to take part in reserve training. On the surface there may seem to be thoughts of a militia system surfacing yet the Bundeswehr is a long way from moving in that direction. Such a move would not be possible in the light of its alliance commitments or the country's domestic or social policy, it was stated firmly at the ministry of defense.

Overmechanization at the Cost of Infantry Strength?

The present Bundeswehr consists of highly mechanized units, criticized by many experts as overmechanized, awkward and far too expensive. These criticisms are part of the complex of questions concerning the politically, financially and technically defensible "weapons mix" of a modern army. A number of proposals for an alternative defense concept have already been put forward. The charge that the Bundeswehr, with its tanks, is an offensive rather than a defensive armed force can be responded to by the fact that one German armored division has only as many tanks as a Soviet motorized rifle division. The tactics of the numerically inferior force must be mobile, is the response of one experienced tank battalion commander, and this implies in the tactical sector the capacity to undertake an offensive defense. Without tanks the firepower necessary for a counter stroke cannot be massed even within a relatively small area. Given the doctrine of forward defense, meaning along the eastern border of the Federal Republic with a minimal abandonment of territory, heavy armored forces will continue to be necessary.

Another question appears to be the degree to which such units should still be concentrated so far forward in the smallest tactical framework and still be effective. The advance of large concentrations of tank artillery on the

Soviet side could relatively quickly bring about a sifting up of the first Western defense line so as to avoid an initial hostile barrage and be able to halt such an attack through a counterattack. In any case, the periodically heard assertion that the day of the tank has passed owing to significantly improved antitank weapons is not convincing. To rely on a single defensive weapon such as antitank missiles without a balanced "weapons mix," reminds military thinkers of the "Maginot doctrine"--however mobile such a concept might be. Such a one-sided concentration would immediately provoke technological and tactical evasive action.

Cuations against the "danger of overloading the armed forces with technology" have been raised by Gen Uhle-Wettler of the Bundeswehr's tank corps, whose alternative proposal to the army's present structure is largely rooted in the tactical sector while the counter-theories of the former general of armored infantry, Loeser, or the peace researcher Afheldt propose a defense in depth less in line with the alliance obligations of the Federal Republic. Uhle-Wettler correctly points out the Bundeswehr's weakness in infantry, which will not be supplanted by the new organizational structure. Since more than one third of the territory of the Federal Republic is forested, densely settled or mountainous, an overmechanized army, too heavily dependent upon its logistical "tail," would not be able to operate effectively in a large part of its territory. The recipe reads: more light infantry at the cost of tanks and heavy armored infantry. Official objections are that light infantry of this type would not have sufficient strength to achieve the deterrent effect necessary for the integrated forward defense. In fact, almost all alternative proposals fail to take account of the fact that the Bundeswehr has specific NATO obligations to meet--nto just along its Eastern border region, in purely national terms, but also in those clearly demarcated areas assigned to it. Yet Uhle-Wettler's theses do deserve attention as a provocative warning against extravagant mechanization ("Vermarderung") of the infantry component and have found resonance among line officers as long as additional infnatry would be achieved without neglect of mechanization--which in manpower or fiscal terms is something not likely to come to pass. The term "Vermarderung" derives from the name of the present armored personnel carrier, an expensive multiple purpose weapons system, whose armored infantry and antitank capabilities cannot be fully exploited. Instead, it comes across as a show-horse example of an already obsolete perfectionist weapon platform system which will lead to ever more expensive weapons platforms. It must be supplanted by a systems concept which places more emphasis on the increased effectiveness of its ammunition, where totally new horizons are opening up in terms of the technological revolutionization of trajectory-controlled projectiles.

Necessary Provocation

In contrast to Uhle-Wettler's criticism, part of which had earlier been taken into account but which now has basically been overtaken by the adoption of "Army Structure 4," the alternative concepts of Loeser and Afheldt seem more on the order of contributions to a debate on strategy. Both have reservations about the credibility of forward defense and "flexible response" which pose the threat of employment of nuclear weapons which would destroy what is

intended to be defended. Loeser sees the current alternatives as nuclear apocalypse or capitulation, to which he opposes, under the motto of "neither red nor dead," the concept of a defense in depth. While abandoning tactical nuclear weapons--strategic nuclear deterrent potential would remain primarily air and sea based--76 brigades of varying composition would be deployed as a shield in border areas and in the interior. This concept comprises national as well as allied, military as well as civilian forces within a concept of total defense. In addition, 24 highly mobile brigades would be organized as operative units and as a counter-attack reserve. Whether this concept of conventional defense possesses sufficient deterrent potential may be doubtful. Nonetheless, his proposal deserves a more thorough assessment by policy makers that it has received to date.

Afheldt's partisan warfare proposal, on the other hand, which would deploy thousands of tiny, autonomous, specially equipped commando units operating from a large number of resistance pockets with only light antitank weapons, seems scarcely realistic. While this concept does not depart formally from its alliance framework, it is characterized by an obsession with national interests. Furthermore, it abandons completely the use of armored units, an air force and the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic. What is dominant here is a kind of understandable wishful thinking --even to the point of its ten thousandfold assumption of the mythical combat readiness of a sort of German Wilhelm Tell.

The concept of the "social defense" put forward by the Berlin political scientist Theodor Ebert appears, by contrast, to be relatively more thoroughgoing in its utopianism by proposing to abolish the army altogether. His proposal for nonviolent refusal of obedience and passive resistance is historically rooted in the initial illusions of the Czechoslovak people's resistant attitude during the Soviet invasion of 1968. That it can lay claim to no deterrent effect is the mildest criticism that can be brought against this utopia. Nonetheless, even this proposal deserves a place within the spectrum of alternatives which must be brought to bear on the bureaucratic routine of traditional military organizational planning, since without sufficiently provocative criticism any army structure threatens in the end to become a self-serving hierarchy.

9878

CSO: 3103/576

ACTIONS ON COMMUNITY LEVEL AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS STATIONING

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jun 82 pp 58-63

[Article: "Simply Shake Off"]

[Text] Local politicians everywhere--from Kiel to Muehldorf-on-Inn--want to declare their communities "nonnuclear zones." Green [environmental protection-oriented] city councillors expect a "pacifist wildfire."

Andreas Urschlechter, Nuremberg's lord mayor, broached fundamentals. In regard to "issues that spring from the anxiety of the time," mused the lord mayor, it would be permissible "to voice the wishes of the citizenry."

And since in the opinion of the Social Democrat the question concerning "nuclear energy for defense purposes" is a question that affects "to a large extent the concerns of every single citizen," the comrade considered it "permissible" to discuss it "in the municipal council."

Moreover: In the city council, Urschlechter pushed through a motion introduced by his fraction, which advocates "resolute opposition to the stationing or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the area and vicinity of the city of Nuremberg."

This was nearly a quarter century ago, in May 1958. But when at the end of last year the two representatives of the "Greens/Independents" in the same city council brought forward a motion to the effect that Nuremberg should again reject any stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the vicinity of the city, Urschlechter--now the most senior lord mayor in the Federal Republic--no longer showed any interest in the resolution.

He brusquely stated that the motion was nothing but "a declaration of war against our alliance." The lord mayor did not even bother to include the issue in the agenda.

The members of the alternative movement, who did not like "being simply shaken off," 3 months later brought forward the motion anew and again they were turned down. However: 67 of 70 local politicians did not want to fall short of the city council resolution of 1958 and assented to a modified version of the draft resolution. According to the resolution, the city council "will not of itself support any measures" that would further "the stationing or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the vicinity of the city of Nuremberg."

The Nuremberg resolution is part of a series of similar actions in municipal politics: Following the example of British and Dutch colleagues, alternative-oriented politicians, but also comrades in cities such as Kassel, Kiel, Hannover and Munich or in communities such as the Upper-Bavarian Muehldorf-on-Inn, demand that their home town be declared a nonnuclear zone. Already, councillors of the "Greens" [environmental protection-oriented deputies] claim they have detected in the Federal Republic a "pacifist wildfire."

The spark was supplied by the NATO resolution stipulating that in the event of a breakdown of armament negotiations an additional 108 "Pershing 2" missiles and 464 cruise missiles be deployed in West Europe by the summer of 1982--which resolution also triggered the Bonn peace demonstrations in October 1981 (300,000 participants) and during the Reagan visit at the beginning of this month (350,000 demonstrators).

In their search of methods of carrying the anti-nuclear-weapons protest into the province, West Germany's peace lovers soon hit upon foreign models, above all in the Netherlands: At the end of last year, the small town of Hellevoetsluis had kicked off the campaign by resolving not to tolerate in the town's vicinity the stationing or the transport of nuclear weapons. Since then, every 10th Dutch community--altogether 75 cities and communities, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the university town of Delft--has passed a similar resolution.

In Great Britain, where approximately 150 cities intend to ban the bomb, the City Council of Great London at the beginning of this month declared the capital a "nonnuclear zone."

Like the politicians abroad, the pacifism-oriented local politicians in the Federal Republic regard NATO's counterarming as dangerous to the civilian population: They argue the nuclear weapons arsenal, which--as has been illustrated by a poster of the "Greens"--even now is covering the entire republic, is a key target for nuclear attacks by the enemy.

To be sure, in many cities, in which the "Greens" have brought forward anti-nuclear-weapons motions, the discussion revolves around formalities rather than missiles, namely around the question whether the municipal council is the right place for such deliberations.

It is especially the Christian Democrats who oppose local disarmament resolutions: They argue that the communities are not qualified to discuss such issues. The officials of the community supervisory board frequently make their decisions on the basis of personal preference or party affiliation--irrespective of whether or not the motions are justified.

Thus, at the end of May, the government of Upper-Bavaria stated that municipal council resolutions concerning nuclear weapons were "not permissible": According to the government lawyers, stationary nuclear weapons are the concern of no one but the Federal Government. The president of the Kassel [Hesse] Government differed: He did not see anything wrong about an anti-nuclear-weapons motion of the local SPD city council fraction and he rejected the protest lodged by the CDU, since "the interests of the city" of Kassel could very well be "specially" affected by a stationing of nuclear weapons.

The controversy about what is and what is not the concern of the communities is as old as the debate about nuclear armament. In the 1950's, when the question of nuclear weapons for the Federal Armed Forces was under discussion, the Social Democrats mobilized dozens of cities and communities against the plans of the Adenauer Government. A great many local politicians adopted resolutions such as that of the Offenbach (Hesse) city councillors:

"The City Government is charged with offering resolute opposition—within the framework of the law—to the stationing or storage of nuclear weapons in the territory of the city of Offenbach on Main. Above all, it is necessary to withhold any support of such plans through supply of land or services."

A ruling passed at that time by the Federal Constitutional Court provides the framework, within which the communities can take action: In 1958, when the SPD—supported by the Hesse communities—wanted to stage a "referendum concerning the nuclear arming of the Federal Republic," the highest German court stopped the campaign. The judges ruled that "taking a position on the issue of the Federal Armed Forces' equipment" was "not one of the concerns of local jurisdictions":

"The concerns of local jurisdictions include only concerns that are rooted in the local community or that can be handled autonomously and independently by this local community. The community may protest against a state measure affecting it (e.g., if an import port suffers sizable losses on account of new import duties); but it exceeds its legally prescribed limits, if it passes resolutions on general, supra-regional, possibly highly political issues...."

The jurists also specified the circumstances under which a community may be permitted to take a stand on issues such as sidewalk dimensions or sewer connections: Whenever there is the "concrete intention to establish in its community territory" projects such as "a nuclear reactor, an airport, a military installation, e.g. a launching pad for nuclear missiles."

Thus anti-nuclear-weapons motions must be related to local concerns. For example, the "Greens" based a motion to declare the Upper-Bavarian Inn region, where construction work has been started on a missile site, a nonnuclear zone on the following argument: "The Muehldorf district contains Europe's largest natural gas reservoir and subsequent to the shooting down of enemy aircraft the entire district would blow up."

The Party Congress of the SPD's Kassel Subdistrict appealed to the people to oppose NATO's counterarming plans, because the city—"as the second most important Federal German armaments center and as a place close to the border surely is on the target list for a nuclear attack."

In Frankfurt's City Parliament, efforts by the "Greens" to establish—without any site-related substantiation—a "nonnuclear zone Frankfurt-on-Main" failed on account of the joint resistance offered by the CDU and the SPD, which refused—primarily because of "cogent legal considerations"—to include the unusual motion in the agenda. In the meantime, however, Frankfurt's Social Democrats have made an about-turn and have brought forward a motion of their own—a motion that they hope will prove "legally waterproof."

By means of a formalist trick, the Frankfurt comrades are trying to give their aversion to nuclear weapons a constitutional basis: They have couched the desire for a nonnuclear Frankfurt in a motion stipulating that the City Parliament "welcome" the proposals that recently were submitted by the "Palme Commission" (named after the former Swedish premier) and that provide for nonnuclear zones--each 150 kilometers wide--on either side of the East-West border.

According to City Councillor Karlheinz Berkemeier (SPD), the local relation stipulated by the Federal Constitutional Court thus is established: Frankfurt lies within the 150-kilometer zone.

Moreover, according to a motion brought forward, the City Council--through both the Hesse and the German city conferences--is to request the Federal Government to champion the Palme Commission proposals in the Western alliance and to urge the Soviet Union to contribute to the implementation of these proposals.

In a similar fashion--via the City Conference--the Frankfurt City Council in December 1978 had conveyed to Bonn a federal politics-related request of an altogether different kind: The request--adopted in consequence of a CDU motion--that the Bundestag [Lower House] speedily tighten up the sanctions against demonstrations.

8760

CSO: 3103/551

VAN MIERLO, DEN UYL ON NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 22 Jun 82 p 3

[Text] The Hague, 22 Jun--According to the Netherlands minister of defense, Van Mierlo, the establishment of a zone without nuclear battlefields in Central Europe, as called for by the so-called Palme Commission, can increase the chance of conventional war in Europe.

The creation of a zone free of nuclear battlefield weapons, to extend 150 kilometers on both sides of the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is one of the most prominent recommendations of the final report of the Palme Commission, an international group of politicians who are developing initiatives in the area of disarmament. The Dutch translation of the report, *Allies in Security*, was handed over to Van Mierlo yesterday by former Dutch prime minister Den Uyl, himself a member of the commission.

Van Mierlo stated that the existence of such a zone could give the participants in a conflict the false impression that they could restrict their struggle to a "Falklands War" without the use of nuclear weapons. Van Mierlo pointed out that in times of tension the clearing of the zone could quickly be undone, a difficulty which was also mentioned in the report, for that matter.

At the press conference, Van Mierlo also expressed his objections to a "no first use" declaration. The solemn vow that the West would never be the first to employ nuclear weapons would affect the preventive force of nuclear weapons and reduce the pressure for negotiations, Van Mierlo said.

Negotiations

At the presentation, Den Uyl said that he was opposed to the slighting language sometimes heard in the peace movement about negotiations and treaties on arms control. Because 95 percent of all nuclear weapons are in the hands of the United States or the Soviet Union, he said, there is no other path toward reducing and banning nuclear weapons than via negotiations between these two nations.

Among the elements particularly dear to him, the former prime minister mentioned the rejection of "linkage," that is, making negotiations on arms control conditional on other aspects of Soviet behavior, such as Afghanistan and Poland.

Den Uyl also expressed his satisfaction with the final report's rejection of any thought of a limited nuclear war, and thereby implicitly of the current NATO doctrine of "flexible response," the gradual response to hostile actions with increasingly heavy nuclear materiel.

Den Uyl had "heartily" supported the proposal by the FRG commission member Egon Bahr to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European countries which do not themselves possess those weapons. No agreement was reached within the commission on that proposal, so it was not contained in the final report.

The report does contain, however, a recommendation for a Soviet-U.S. agreement about the number of intermediate range weapons in Europe at such a level as would permit NATO to refrain from the deployment of a new generation of these nuclear missiles.

In this passage, Den Uyl made it clear that he is opposed to an attempt to attain exact equality between the East and the West on every level for every weapons category.

6940

CS0: 3105

DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY FOR PERIOD 1973-81

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 25 Jun 82 pp 592-595

[Text] In this sector likewise can see the big difference in the energy consumption growth rates which characterized the years prior to 1973 and the years thereafter with the drastic change in the housing industry and the energy market and the increasing awareness of the conservation problem.

The years prior to 1973 and above all the 1960's brought exceptional growth in energy consumption in the domestic and tertiary sectors as a direct consequence of the process of development and the vast expansion of housing construction for office space, with buildings equipped with heating plants and with plans for centralized air conditioning in many cases without taking into account possible energy savings.

At the same time private housing construction developed tremendously, accompanied by a process of replacement of traditional-type heating appliances (stoves, fireplaces, etc.) with centralized and autonomous plants, supplied primarily with petroleum products and natural gas.

In 1965, the number of families owning centralized or autonomous heating plants was about 20 percent of the total; in 1974, the percentage had gone up to more than 50 percent.

That year at the same time marked the end of the exceptional process of expansion of energy use in this sector and the manifestation of tendencies in the matter of prices which were entirely in contrast to those recorded until that moment.

It must however be noted that, while in the case of fuels, used mostly for environmental heating, we had a continuous decline, in the case of electric energy, used for essential purposes (lighting, moving power) as well as thermal purposes (production of hot water, heating), we record only a reduction in the growth rates compared to the recent past.

In the case of fuels as a matter of fact we were facing mostly circumstances which held the growth down, such as limited housing construction activities, at least when compared to the trend in the recent past, and the price effect which raised heating expenditures to very high levels also in real terms; finally we had the passage of legislation for rationalization and conservation (Law 373).

In this context we must underscore the heavy increase in natural gas whose share went up from 9.0 percent in 1970 to 17.4 percent in 1974 and 32.5 percent in 1980. There are many reasons that influenced this development; among the most important ones we have these: the long period of low prices on natural gas for civilian uses compared to the price of gas-oil for heating; the delay with which the process of getting these two prices together was started; the gradual increase in the available volume which speeded up the conversion of many plants that had used petroleum products; the new design criteria, often encouraged by the local administrations which favored gas supply for heating plants, both centralized and individual, and those for the production of hot utility water in the new housing developments.

Petroleum products (gas-oil and fuel oil in particular) on the other hand revealed a clear tendency toward a decline starting in 1974; as a matter of fact, in 1970, their share was 78.0 percent, in 1974 it was 76.4 percent, and finally in 1980 it was 61.8 percent.

In the case of electric energy, factors of stabilizing the demand for it (reduced housing construction activities, saturation of the market for some electrical household appliances) were amply compensated for by the appearance on the market of new electric household appliances and by the effect of rate policies (social slice) which practically prevented (perhaps with the exception of 1980) the manifestation of a price effect comparable to that of fuels.

During this period of time we saw the development of some electric energy uses which are extremely burdensome in terms of primary energy, for example, the production of hot water for hygienic and sanitary uses which reached a level of 27.7 percent of the energy used for this purpose. This process took place also since the opportunities for substitution with other sources and systems took shape specifically only in recent years.

In 1980, the development of energy consumption in the civilian use sector showed a reduction of 3.3 percent compared to the preceding year; this can be attributed to the noticeable increase in fuel prices and to the standards for the limitation of heating hours during the first few months of the year.

During the first half of 1981, in a situation which nevertheless did bring rises in energy product prices less than the costs of the raw material, the consumption trend in the civilian and agricultural sectors remained substantially stable (down 0.3 percent) compared to the corresponding period of time in 1980.

We must also note the further penetration of gas (up 3.3 percent), along with the increase in solid fuels (up 8.9 percent) and electric energy (up 4.5 percent) while petroleum is declining rather noticeably (down 3.7 percent). This situation should continue throughout the year except for unusual weather factors.

Energy in Agricultural Sector

The CNEL [National Council for Economy and Labor] has already examined with in-depth studies the energy problems of the agricultural, forest, and food system (CNEL, Agriculture Commission "Agriculture and Energy," Liguori, Bartolelli, and Pellizzi). Reference is made to this work for an analysis pertaining to the energy topics in this sector and the activities connected with it.

The research done on direct and indirect energy consumption updated as of 1977 is of particular interest; in connection with this we are presenting several tables below, summarized by source and by typology and consumption.

Until 1973, passenger transportation showed very significant growth rates (8.1 percent from 1970 until 1973) in the context of a process of radical change in favor of private transportation which progressively increased its share compared to the growth in the number of cars as a whole, in turn promoted by the increase in family incomes and by a policy that encouraged car use.

The construction of a vast network of highways--while investments in the railroad sector and in public transportation systems were kept at low levels--assumed decisive importance in the promotion of private transportation in urban areas and out in the open country.

Parallel to that, energy consumption (mostly gasoline) increased at very noticeable rates (during the period of 1970-1973 it was still 6.3 percent on an annual average).

Although the auto inventory continued to grow, the average trip after 1973 began to decrease, first of all slowly and then more noticeably as a result of traffic saturation, car movement restriction measures in urban areas, and the rise in gas prices.


All of this led to a reduction in the development of energy consumption without however achieving any noteworthy changes in the manner of transportation except for some limited steps in support of mass transportation.

After 1973, the slower growth rate of the economy reduced the expansion of goods transportation but did not redimension the role of highway transportation which was promoted by the policy of low gas-oil taxes.

In 1980, the sector's total consumption went up by 1.5 percent compared to 1979 (from 25.0 to 25.4 million tep).

In the field of passenger transportation, which was concentrated above all on private transportation, the increase was below average in spite of a hefty increase in the number of cars.

Prices (1) of Gas-Oil Used for Heating in Current Currency; 1973--First Half of 1981.



Key: (1) Weighted annual average of consumer prices; 2--Lire per liter; 3--First half.
Source: Data prepared by ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency].

Civilian and Agricultural Uses (1) (1,000 tep [Tons Of Petroleum Equivalent])

	2	3
	Gennaio-Giugno 1981	Variaz. % Genn.-Giugno 81/80
4 Combustibili solidi	490	+8,9
5 Gas naturale	5.183	+3,3
6 Petrolio	10.328	-3,7
7 — di cui gasolio riscaldamento	6.900	-3,1
8 Energia elettrica	2.915	+4,5
Total	18.916	-0,3

Key: (1) Includes domestic, commercial uses, services [utilities], and public administration; 2--January-June; 3--Percentage change, January-June, 1981/1980; 4--Solid fuels; 5--Natural gas; 6--Petroleum; 7--Including gas-oil for heating; 8--Electric energy. Source: ENI estimates

Indirect Energy Consumption by Agricultural-Forestry Compartment

	3 Consumi			
4	Mezzi di produzione	5	6	
		Valutazioni Eni (1976)	Valutazioni 1979	
		7 Mtep/anno	7 Mtep/anno	%
8	Materiale di propagazione	—	0,35	4,2
9	Fertilizzanti	1,74	1,85	22,4
10	Fitofarmaci	0,34	0,60	6,7
11	Macchine e impianti	0,65	1,30	14,5
12	Alimenti zootecnici industriali	(1)	2,50	30,3
13	Materiali di consumo per la produzione	0,03 (2)	0,50	5,5
14	Investimenti fondiari	2,15	1,40	16,4
	Total	4,91	8,50	100,0

Key: (1) The ENI study did not consider this item; (2) Only plastic substances; 3--Consumption; 4--Means of production; 5--ENI estimates (1976); 6--1979 estimates; 7--Millions of tep per year; 8--Propagation material; 9--Fertilizer; 10--Pharmaceuticals for plants; 11--Machinery and systems; 12--Industrial animal fodder; 13--Consumption material for production; 14--Real estate investments.

Table 1

	70	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
3 Numeri indici 1970 = 100									
4 Consumi delle famiglie (1)	100	112,6	115,5	113,9	117,9	120,7	124,3	130,8	136,6
5 Consumi di combustibili (2)	100	122,2	119,3	122,2	127,9	116,8	128,5	127,2	121,4
6 Prezzo del gasolio (1)	100	98,5	196,6	184,3	205,5	235,5	224,3	257,6	345,9
7 Consumi di energia elettr.	100	129,7	137,7	141,6	150,6	158,2	169,8	180,9	187,7

Key: (1) 1970 constant values; (2) Petroleum products, solid fuels, natural gas; 3--Numerical indexes, 1970 = 100; 4--Family consumption; 5--Fuel consumption; 6--Gas-oil prices; 7--Electric energy consumption. Source: Figures prepared by ENI.

Direct Energy Consumption for Agricultural-Forestry Subsystem (1979)

A. By Energy Sources

	3	4	5	6	7
Fonti 2	Prodotti 7 Petrolifert (Mtep/anno)	Gas 7 Naturale (Mtep/anno)	Energia elettrica (Mtep/anno)	Risorse Rinnovabili (Mtep/anno)	Total (Mtep/anno)
Fonti Ufficiali (per sola produz.)	2,100	0,017	0,190	—	2,307
Valutazioni Cnr (1) (produzione ed abita- zioni agricole)	4,050	0,030	0,370	0,300	4,750

Key: (1) Done in the context of the final project for agricultural mechanization of the CNR [National Research Council]; 2--Sources; 3--Petroleum products; 4--Natural gas; 5--Electric energy; 6--Renewable resources; 7--Millions of tep per year.

Direct Energy Consumption for Agricultural-Forestry Subsystems (1979)
[continued from preceding page]

b. By Type of Direct Consumption (Agricultural Production and Housing)

1 Consumo totale 6(Mtep/anno)	2 Meccaniz- zazione di campo 6 (Mtep/anno)	3 Impianti aziendali 6 (Mtep/anno)	4 Energia elettrica 6 (Mtep/anno)	5 Energia termica per usi domestici 6 (Mtep/anno)
4,750	2,480	0,670	0,370	1,270

Key: 1--Total consumption; 2--Rural mechanization; 3--Farm installations; 4--Electric energy; 5--Thermal energy for domestic uses; 6--Millions of tep per year. Source: CNEL.

Transportation (1,000; tep)

	2 Gennaio - Giugno 1981	3 Variaz. % Genn. - Giug. 81/80
4 Prodotti petroliferi	11.837	+ 1,9
5 di cui:		
6 — benzina	5.728	— 0,7
7 — gasolio autotrazione	5.145	+ 6,8
8 di cui per tipo di impiego:		
9 — trasporto privato	7.015	+ 1,1
10 — trasporto merci	4.147	+ 5,5
11 — trasporto aereo	675	— 10,0
12 Altre fonti (1)	380	— 2,6
Total	12.217	+ 1,7
13 Bunkeraggi	2.128	— 0,3

Key: (1) Including solid fuel, natural gas, and electric energy; 2--January-June; 3--Percentage variation, January-June, 1981/1980; 4--Petroleum products; 5--Including; 6--Gasoline; 7--Automotive gas-oil; 8--Including by type of use; 9--Private transportation; 10--Freight transportation; 11--Air transportation; 12--Other sources (1); 13--Bunker.

Energy in Transportation Sector (Decade of 1970-1980, 1980, 1st Half of 1981)

	70	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
	2 Numeri indici (1970 = 100)								
3 Parco auto a benzina	100	130,8	139,0	144,2	154,0	158,5	162,9	170,8	175,5
4 Prezzo della benzina super (1)	100	97,0	125,3	119,1	137,1	143,3	127,4	118,0	129,8
5 Consumi di benzina	100	121,2	111,6	119,6	115,8	112,9	120,5	130,0	131,5

Key: (1) Constant values, 1970; 2--Index numbers; 3--Gasoline-powered cars; 4--Price of super gasoline (1); 5--Gasoline consumption. Source: Prepared by ENI.

Passenger Transportation Structure (1) (Millions of Passenger-Kilometers)

	Ferrovia 2	3 Autobus e Filobus Extraurbani	4 Via D'acqua	5 Aereo	6 Autobus ed Altri mezzi Collett. urbani	7 Mezzi Privati	Total
1970	35.130	21.937	778	1.438	13.825	234.422	307.531
1973	39.182	25.883	863	1.965	16.154	304.728	388.775
1978	42.520	40.085	1.037	2.373	24.610	355.747	466.373
1979	43.500	48.843	1.114	2.876	26.880	353.284	476.497

Key: (1) National transportation account; 2--Railroad; 3--Bus and trolley bus, inter-city; 4--Water ways; 5--Air; 6--Bus and other urban mass transportation; 7--Private transportation.

In particular, the increase in the gasoline-power motor pool, which was still decisive by the end of the development of the economic situation, was counterbalanced by a less than proportional increase in consumption (up 1.2 percent). Increases in gasoline prices, reduced tourist traffic, greater use of public transportation in some urban centers--these considerably reduced the average trip.

Various developments took place in the field of diesel vehicles (about 2.6 percent of the total) where the exceptional development of the inventory was also counterbalanced by a noticeable increase in gas-oil consumption due to the long average trips for which these cars are used.

Freight transportation, especially long-distance, was positively affected by a series of technical improvements (longer range of vehicles, greater engine power, etc.) and recorded an energy consumption increase (mostly gas-oil) in excess of 2 percent compared to the favorable development of industrial production and the delays in the implementation of policies promoting other types of transportation, such as maritime and rail.

Maritime bunker activities did decline from 5.1 million tep in 1979 to 4.3 million tep in 1980 due to the effect of the poor competitiveness of prices (implemented on Italian ships) and the decline in international shipping.

During the first half of 1981, the transportation sector's development was characterized by differentiated processes; concerning gasoline vehicles, there was an increase in registration in the cars on the highway but at the same time there was a drop in average trips; this gives us a decline in gasoline consumption (down 0.7 percent); the negative tendency is becoming accentuated during the second half of the year.


Overall, consumption for private transportation went up very modestly (up 1.1 percent); consumption for freight transportation on the other hand revealed signs of noticeable increase (up 5.5 percent), concentrated on gas-oil; air transportation (dropped 10 percent).

Freight Traffic Structure (1) (Millions of Ton-Kilometers)

	2 Ferrovie	3 Vie d'acqua	4 Aeree	5 Autotrasporti	6 Oleodotti	Total
1970	18.967	22.889	11	58.658	9.074	109.599
1973	18.625	25.507	16	61.929	11.609	117.686
1978	17.402	26.185	12	88.022	11.735	143.356
1979	18.467	28.471	20	112.701	13.615	173.275

Key: (1) National transportation account; 2--Railroads; 3--Waterways; 4--Air; 5--Motor transport; 6--Oil pipelines.

Prices (1) of Automotive Gasoline and Gas-Oil in Current Currency; 1973--1st Half of 1981.



Key: (1) Weighted annual average of prices at the pump; 2--Lire per liter; 3--Gasoline; 4--Gas-oil; 5--First half. Source: Prepared by ENI.

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CSO: 3104/247

PETROLEUM UNION PRESIDENT ON SECTOR'S SERIOUS SITUATION

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 25 Jun 82 pp 581-585

[Speech by Petroleum Union President Achille Albonetti]

[Excerpts] The annual meeting of the Petroleum Union was held in Rome on 23 June in the technology auditorium of Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry]; in addition to many top officials from Confindustria, the conference was also attended by Minister of State Participations De Michelis and Minister of Tourism Signorello and the undersecretary in the Ministry of Industry. UP [Petroleum Union] President Achille Albonetti reviewed the current extremely grave situation in the petroleum sector. Below we are publishing a lengthy summary of his speech.

The Italian Situation

Italy's economic development in 1981 featured both similarities and major differences when compared to the other industrialized countries of the West against a background of profound change and rapid and difficult transition toward new equilibriums.

The general situation continues to be extremely grave.

The state of public finance is dramatic and urgently calls for sacrifices and courageous measures.

In connection with a slight decline in the GNP (down 0.2 percent), the energy demand decreased somewhat more (down 3 percent, approximately).

This decline is the final results of a noticeable increase in coal consumption (up 6 percent), slight increases in the use of primary electric energy (up 3.1 percent), a slight decline in the use of methane gas and a drop (down 5 percent) in the consumption of petroleum, which slipped from 99 down to 94 million t.

Ever since the first oil crisis, the energy balance has revealed dramatically growing deficits--essentially due to oil imports--which rose from 2 percent to 8 percent of the gross domestic product, that is, 1,600 billion lire in 1973, 8,000 in 1977, 22,000 in 1980, and almost 32,000 in 1981.

In 1981, petroleum in Italy still met 66 percent of the total energy needs against a European average of 50 percent.

Italy's energy dependence on foreign sources, concentrated on petroleum, is even greater and therefore even more serious. In the EIA countries, the share of imported petroleum out of the total imported energy volume—which was already considerably lower than in Italy—dropped 33 percent down to 28 percent between 1978 and 1980.

The Italian share continues to be around 80 percent.

In Italy, as a matter of fact, use of alternate energy sources (essentially nuclear power and coal) has fallen tremendously behind. The supply of nuclear energy is among the lowest in the industrialized world.

Although in 1981 the quantities of oil remained less than what they were in 1980, the petroleum bill was higher by a good 43 percent, rising from 19,000 to 28,000 billion mostly because of the rise in the value of the dollar.

According to the estimates in the National Energy Plan, the percentage of oil consumed in Italy, compared to the total energy requirements, should go down to 50 percent only in 1990; that figure has already been attained by the other European countries.

But if the irresponsible policy of postponements is continued, then it is very probable that this objective will [not] be reached.

The development of the energy market calls for a substantial and rapid conversion of refineries which will have to shift their emphasis, as had been stressed earlier, from heavy products, such as fuel oils, to light products, such as gasoline and gas-oil, which are today more in demand than ever before.

Today, fuel oil accounts for almost 50 percent of the Italian petroleum demand (against a European average of about 30 percent). In the consumption volume estimated by 1990, this percentage will be considerably closer to the European percentage while the share consisting of light and medium distillates (gasoline and gas-oils) will be proportionally higher.

The closing of plants which are now obsolete and conversion of others are therefore steps which are becoming essential so as to guarantee that the new consumption structure will have the necessary production output.

The currently operating refineries should be reduced. Most of those that remain will have to be converted. The rest will have to be boosted.

In this sector we need thousands of billions in investments which could only help us make savings elsewhere in our balance of trade.

The distribution situation is also serious.

In Europe, the distribution network for gasoline and gas-oil for automotive transportation therefore has been restructured also by reducing the sales

outlets to bring the costs in line with the yield. Little or nothing has been done along these lines in Italy.

During the period of 1974-1980, sales outlets were reduced by 27 percent in Germany, 22 percent in Great Britain and 9 percent in France. In Italy the reduction was only 1 percent.

The consequences are obvious.

In 1981, the average fuel sale per sales outlet was 1,310,000 liters in Germany; a little more than 1 million in Great Britain; and only 610,000 liters in Italy.

Nevertheless, the business hours of Italy's almost 40,000 gas stations continued to be 9 hours and 45 minutes for 300 days per year, against a maximum of 15 hours and 30 minutes for 365 days per year in Switzerland and an average of 13 hours and 42 minutes for 350 days per year in Europe.

Italian Energy Policy

In view of the dramatic economic and energy situation and in spite of the vital role which the petroleum industry plays and should play in the long run within the Italian economy, energy policy has for years been disjointed, discontinuous, and contradictory in overall terms.

In October 1981, Parliament practically unanimously approved the National Energy Plan with enormous delay and for the second time. The plan is characterized by a calibrated statement of problems and objectives.

Nevertheless, it continues to be a dead letter.

We are falling further and further behind in the development of alternate sources, especially nuclear power and coal.

We are not doing anything to give important agencies, such as ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] stable operational conditions and financial self-sufficiency which is why we harm thousands of billions in investments for the construction of electric power plants.

The ENEL has recorded unacceptable postponements in payments to petroleum outfits going into the hundreds of billions for fuel oil supplies. This brings to the absurd situation of the petroleum industry with its balance sheets in total disarray, even though it is supposed to finance ENEL's electric power production with that money. In other words, a case of the blind leading the blind.

After having had four presidents in a little more than 3 years, ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] is now under provisional receivership [under commission control].

Finally, we allow the ruinous crisis in the petroleum industry to become worse; the petroleum industry now faces the risk of irreversible decline due to the drastic redimensioning of activities or, worse still, due to the total pullout of some important operators.

The Italian petroleum industry's overall economic account--that is, both public and private--closed the year 1981 with operating losses of around 2,300 billion lire, including 800 in the private segment.

Special ENI Commissioner Gandolfi himself some weeks ago with meritorious frankness estimated his agency's 1981 losses in the petroleum sector at 1,500 billion lire and 37,000 lire per ton.

Industry Minister Marcora in his initial statements a year ago had asserted that ENI was losing between 40,000 and 50,000 lire per ton in the petroleum sector.

During the first 6 months of 1982, losses in the private industry segment alone came to around 600 billion. Those of ENI will probably be similar. These are dramatic figures and they are unbearable.

A share of this enormous liability certainly is due to market factors which in a similar manner struck the European operators. But the Italian companies had to accept conspicuous additional losses springing exclusively from the belated and incomplete application of the so-called method which determines petroleum price fixing procedures.

Each of the six price-raising steps adopted in 1981 came with an average delay of 45 days and with extremely serious delays of 81 and 106 days.

Somewhat shorter delays were recorded in 1980, the first year for the application of the current system.

The recent rise, pertaining to the distribution cost portion, came 70 days late and the delay was 6 days for the gasoline and gas-oil portion.

The only changes where the punctuality of application proved to come with more than Prussian and noisy promptness took place during the first part of this year when an attempt was made to reduce the industrial prices of gasoline and gas-oils, first of all to the advantage of the consumer and then in favor of the treasury.

These reductions certainly are legitimate on the basis of the criteria contained in the method. This legitimacy however becomes debatable when stable rules are linked only with that portion of contracting parties who are forced to accept the situation as it is.

There is obviously going to be a lack of confidence on the part of operators in a system which has been violated systematically by an agency which instead was supposed to guarantee the regular application of these rules.

This means that it has become absolutely necessary for the petroleum operators to acquire certainty as to what is going to happen. Hence, our insistence on calling for the progressive extension of the system of surveillance over products which are now administered, starting with gas-oil.

Several parties have objected to this request, maintaining that, if it were approved, the companies would be given full discretion in fixing prices, thus in practice turning the current situation around which primarily makes the government the arbiter.

That is wrong.

Surveillance does not mean liberalization of prices, nor does it mean the ability to fix prices on petroleum products at random.

Surveillance as a matter of fact would leave completely intact the criterion of lining up Italian prices with the average of European prices as worked out by the European Community, and as had already been provided in the current method.

The only significant innovation would consist in giving the petroleum companies the ability themselves to perform the adaptation transaction (up or down) but only if stabilized conditions were to develop and under the supervision of the CIP [Interministerial Price Committee] which, in case of anomalies, can intervene to correct the situation and threaten penalties.

It is not a secret and we have said so several times that we are in favor of liberalization. But if we continue surveillance tied to an average international price over which we have no influence, it is because we believe that Italy does not yet have the conditions--especially the psychological conditions--to adopt liberalization.

Let us therefore recall that there is petroleum price liberalization in countries with a socialist administration, such as the FRG, and where there is no calming element as in Italy, where we have an extremely strong government petroleum company, the ENI, which covers about 40 percent of the market and provides more than 50 percent of the crude supplies.

Italy on the other hand has remained the only country in the European Community—and one of the few countries in Western Europe—to maintain a system of administered prices which moreover is handled in an arbitrary and untrustworthy manner. Burdened by tremendous undue losses, deprived of any confidence in an arbitrarily managed system which does not guarantee the minimum elements indispensable for drawing up estimates and considering alternatives, the private operators some time ago in various ways launched a process of disengagement from Italy.

The market share of private petroleum outfits in Italy shrank from 82 percent in 1973 to about 50 percent in 1981.

The market share of the ENI rose parallel to this from 18 percent in 1973 to 40 percent in 1981. The remaining share of 10 percent was covered by imports by direct users, especially ENEL.

Developments are even more symptomatic in the crude supply sector. In 1981, ENI rose to 53 percent from 15 percent in 1973. The private outfits dropped from 85 percent in 1973 to 47 percent in 1981.

Two gigantic multinationals, Shell and BP, pulled out, followed by many although smaller companies, such as Conoco, Cities Service, Getty Oil, and Marathon Oil.

The Monti Group and SIR disappeared from the market and their place was taken by ENI.

This process received new powerful impetus in 1981 and during the first few months of 1982.

Amoco—a big American company—officially announced that it would pull out of the Italian market by 1984.

All private companies were forced to reduce their import and processing activities and their shipments to the consumer, time and again working in short-range terms.

The Bertinico refinery was recently closed by two very big outfits, Gulf and Mobil.

Esso announced the suspension and cancellation of planned investments, as all of the other companies are doing. These are extremely serious measures which damage the future.

Wherever the crisis situation continues to last in Italy, due to the absolute absence of a frame of reference which would give the private entrepreneurs a feeling of confidence, it is evident that this will lead to a further accentuation of this diaspora. We are thus witnessing the progressive disappearance of that large number of operators whose existence was considered essential under the National Energy Plan.

Right now, Italy is losing resources that could still supply jobs and that would require equipment and we are also letting conspicuous investment possibilities go down the drain.

It may be that all of this does not excessively worry many people who think that the state will somehow restore the situation—a mere afterthought, if not a rather slim hope.

The criteria in force for the determination of stockpiles are even today based on assumptions which have changed profoundly and which heavily penalize the refining sector.

The disappearance of the production units of the Monti Group and the new features assumed by the general supply system already urgently call for a revision of these criteria, first of all, the Law of 10 February 1981. This law among other things ordered an increase in the mandatory stockpile from 90 to 100 days of consumption, effective 5 March 1982.

This last provision asks the sector to increase the volume tied up in stockpiles by a further slice of unproductive capital equal to about 1,500 billion lire. In a country which certainly does not have an abundance of capital and in a situation characterized by the availability of products on the international market, this request obviously made the problem even more critical.

We asked Industry Minister Marcora--as we had asked his predecessor--to promote a general review of the issue, where necessary suspending the application of that law for a year.

In collaboration with public enterprises, we furthermore examined the possibility of promoting--as has already been done in other European countries--the establishment of an autonomous agency that would take care of the maintenance and management of the amount of mandatory stockpiles.

We hope that this problem will be solved in an acceptable manner as soon as possible.

Finally, during this first meeting which presents combined within the Union certain tasks which earlier had been assigned to the union association of private petroleum enterprises, I cannot in silence skip over the area of social relations.

We have been able to observe the lineup of the national labor unions in this sector--CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], and UIL [Italian Union of Labor]--with the positions adopted by the industry as such to the effect that the price surveillance system be extended to medium distillates.

This solution has been considered essential also by the labor unions so that rationalization decisions and the adoption of investment programs might be made possible.

Concerning particularly contract activities, we fully agree with the policy pursued by Confindustria in the search for a basis for the system of wage formation in Italy which would be in keeping with the principles of balance and compatibility.

In this connection I would like to reveal that the original element of the structure of the new National Collective Labor Contract in this sector [as published; word missing in original] and that the necessary and urgent investments in distribution have been ignored for some time.

Once again however I had to concentrate instead on the extremely serious conditions in the Italian petroleum industry, further aggravated by a senseless energy and price policy which is part of the country's catastrophic economic and financial situation.

We are doomed to do that because, with a profoundly threatened economic base, everything naturally winds up being catalyzed around the causes that threaten the very survival of these companies.

Conclusions

Italy's economic and energy future is a matter of great concern. It will be dramatic if we continue on this road and if--as far as we are concerned more directly--the implementation of the National Energy Plan, although it was approved by parliament with vast majority, continues to suffer delays, as has been happening for years.

We have been heavily dependent on foreign energy and we will continue to be so for a long time and this dependence on foreign sources will be concentrated on imported petroleum.

It is this extremely risky and extremely burdensome situation which distinguishes Italy from almost all of the other industrialized countries of the world, particularly the European countries.

We are behind in everything. We have done little in the energy saving sector.

We have done very little or nothing in the vital sector of alternate sources (above all nuclear and coal) which should at least in part replace petroleum. And the new or renewable sources (solar, biomass, fusion, etc.) for the time being are just hopes.

According to the repeated statements of the prime minister and the various ministers of industry, energy should be "the top priority." If, that is, it is given that top-priority status on the highest level, if it is assigned its proper strategic value to the economy's growth and survival. Italy has never concentrated so much on the energy sector as in recent years.

Various parliamentary committees--I might in particular recall here the Misasi and Fortuna committees--at length concerned themselves with the problem and arrived at clear conclusions.

The outline of an energy plan was sketched back in 1975, after the extremely serious oil crisis.

Many other plans were prepared at that time, including the plan of Donat Cattin, approved by parliament in 1978, the plan of Prodi, of Nicolazzi, of Bisaglia, of Pandolfi, and the recent plan of Marcora. The latter was passed by a tremendous parliamentary majority of 22 October.

There is noteworthy coherence of objectives and instruments in all of these plans. All plans stress the need for reducing consumption and dangerous dependence on petroleum imports. All underscore the urgency of developing alternate sources, essentially nuclear and coal.

We have for many years had an energy policy characterized by a vast number of investigations, plans, and programs, by a torrent of statements and good intentions.

The seminars, conferences, round-table discussions, meetings, committees, and surveys are increasing at a growing rate.

But specific achievements have been scant and the same is true of occasional specific steps which sometimes were also rather demagogic. In particular, concerning the petroleum sector, the energy plan now in force confirms the need for extremely heavy investments; the usefulness of permanently having a large number of operators on the Italian market; the demand for recognizing the true cost of the raw material; and, as an instrument, the extension of the systems of price surveillance to gas-oil.

Along this line, it is the administration and parliament and also the government petroleum agency itself, the ENI, which over the past 10 years have enormously increased their market and supply shares.

There is an awareness of problems, of their importance to the country's security and development. We talk seriously but we act irresponsibly. The gap between words and deeds keeps growing with time instead of shrinking.

For years we have witnessed continuous postponements for the most varied reasons. In a vital and strategic sector--where we should have a maximum of priorities and responsibility--we instead have a maximum of delays and irresponsibility.

As we stressed earlier, the energy plan provides for a system of price surveillance for gas-oil. This system is essential to guarantee certainty as to the right to at least 85 percent of the barrel.

The ministers of industry have been promising this for many years and they have been planning the construction of nuclear power plants for many years likewise. The conclusions of the recent fact-finding survey conducted by the Senate industry committee underscore the need and urgency of extending the surveillance system to gas-oils on an experimental basis for a year.

Parallel to this, the Chamber's Industry Committee finally in recent days passed a resolution arriving at the same conclusion. That indeed is a source of comfort to us.

It is now up to the administration to speak up. But so far nothing has happened. Nothing but promises.

In the meantime, the petroleum industry continues to decline, to record enormous losses, and above all to live in an uncertainty as to the royalties without being able to do any planning.

We should stop discussing obvious things, such as covering the real cost of crude supplies, and instead we should concentrate on planning investments.

It is absurd to think that the multinational companies should continue to bring money to Italy to make up for our losses caused by an energy policy which has been nonexistent for years whereas we need financial resources to launch the investments.

The operators remaining in Italy have gradually changed from industrialists, from producers and refiners to importers of finished products and to dealers.

This is serious to the economy and the safety of supplies. This is just one step away from abandonment.

Nobody really wants that abandonment. Neither the private companies, nor the energy plan, nor the administration, nor the government petroleum agency. Nevertheless, this is what is happening and nobody is coming up with any remedy. The situation is extremely grave.

Nevertheless, Italy is and for a long time will be one of the world's most worthwhile markets; in 1981, we imported 92 million t of petroleum products, for about 28,000 billion lire. But if things go on the way they are, they will end badly. Not only for us, but for the whole country, which is already paying very dearly for this decay. And it might have to pay even more dearly in the future. We are taking enormous risks.

The new serious tensions in the Middle East and in other parts of the world should constitute a further incentive for action. In view of our protests over the continuous postponements, Spadolini at one time replied to us that "history takes its time."

Energy and petroleum by the way are a little bit like history. They are serious things. They cannot withstand improvisations and they do not accept mediocrity.

Let us get moving. We are very far behind. With intelligence, courage, and willpower, we can still do the job.

5058

CSO: 3104/247

PAPER COMMENTS ON OUTLOOK FOR WIND ENERGY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 82 p 2

[Editorial signed OA: "The Wind, the Water and Werthen"]

[Text] On Monday morning, the largest wind power plant in the world--in Maglarp, a mile west of Trelleborg--stood finished as an exclamation mark pointing to the future. When the rotor points straight toward the sky, the plant stands 120 meters above Soderslatt and the windy coast of Skane.

Sweden has acquired a new place of pilgrimage--by midsummer another large wind power plant will be added on Nasudden on Gotland--and another symbol of our arrival in the age of solar power. For wind indeed is a result of the work of the sun, and--just as the case with energy from hydropower, from wood fuel, peat, and from all heat derived from the sea and air--it can be recycled over and over again by electric or fuel-powered heat pumps.

At the moment, the future of wind power is somewhat uncertain. Governments and industry dare not--or will not--invest heavily before 1984 or 1985, when an evaluation of Maglarp and Nasudden should have been made. Meanwhile, the capacity of the Karlskrona plant, the Gota plant, the Kamewa--formerly Karlstad--mechanized plant, the Saab plant and others may become too large for future requirements.

This is one of many regrettable examples, of how the fast growing surplus of electric power and the consequent (temporary) dumping of electric power during the 1980's have blocked and disturbed the development of the "domestic," preferably renewable, sources of energy which, by the Riksdag decision, we should have in order to reduce our dependence on oil from about 60 percent to perhaps 30 percent by the turn of the century.

Still, many factors speak in favor of wind energy. The new prototypes of three-megawatt output cost almost 100 million krona, including all the development expenses and the extra measuring equipment. However, with mass production the price of each unit may fall to about 20 million krona. Even if approximately 1,000 mills are needed to replace the production capacity of 2 large nuclear reactors, the investment costs will probably be higher than those for nuclear power.

But on the other hand, wind power plants have unlimited, free and ecologically sound fuel. In contrast to water power plants, they can be built and removed without doing damage to the environment, and in contrast to nuclear plants, they can be demolished without astronomical costs.

The wind power plant in Maglarp was dutifully allotted a few seconds on TV2's Sunday night "Report." The program focused even more on a completely peripheral subject from the point of view of Swedish energy interests, that is, whether the Swedish-developed, so-called Sterling motor can possibly be operated by solar energy in California and other Sunbelt states in the United States; presumably, for the purpose of producing electric power for cooling, not for heating. Supposedly, wind power is not sufficiently technical and complicated to arouse the interest of grown-up boys.

Along with the tower in Maglarp, Hans Werthen, spokesman for the Federation of Swedish Industries, also appeared. In a long and deferentially received TT [Press Wire Service, Inc.] interview, Werthen, who is generally considered the wonder boy and pleasantly tough truthsayer of industry, said that "development of two rivers would increase electric power production enough to save approximately 6 million tons of oil."

Strange that no one has thought of this miracle before!

Well, the reason might be that Werthen's figures are all wrong. Nor had he come up with an official denial by Monday night. Do not he or the Federation of Industries have an expert who can read or is it that they simply don't care about grossly misleading information as long as it supports their argument?

Six million tons of oil has the heating power of more than 60 billion kilowatt hours. Assuming also an extremely low effectivity in converting this oil into heating, or to electric power in a condensation power plant, the output will be at least 35 billion kilowatt hours utilized heating in home consumption, and so on, and probably higher, or 24 billion via condensation power plants. But the expansion of two of the four untouched rivers--Kalix, Torne, Pitea and Vindel--will only yield about 8 billion kilowatt hours a year.

Even if every effort were made to make the river yield the maximum output, and with heat pumps yielding recyclable energy, this would at the most result in 25 billion kilowatt hours heating. For that much produced by a heating pump is undeniably more than 8 billion kilowatt hours of electric heat, or equal the output from hydroelectric dams on two rivers. But not even that can replace Werthen's 6 million tons of oil.

If Werthen does not believe us, he can consult the booklet "Electricity--for a Better Economy," recently published by his own Federation of Industries. The booklet contains an extreme example where almost all electric power is generated from heating pumps (page 21); in this example, they have succeeded in saving approximately 6 million tons of oil--with the aid of 30.8 billion kilowatt hours electric power. But two rivers yield, as mentioned above, only 8 or--we will not be stingy--10 billion kilowatt hours electric power. Werthen must have grabbed the rest out of the air.

OIL PRICE DECLINE REDUCING INTEREST IN WIND ENERGY, EXPORTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 May 82 p 5

[Article by Bo Engzell: "The Great Lift on Soderslatt: The World's Largest Windmill"]

[Text] The great lift of the world's largest wind power plant was started Saturday in Maglarp on Soderslatt between Malmo and Trelleborg. There, in Sweden's windiest spot, the prototype of what was planned to be the power plant of the future is erected.

It was also expected to be a great boost for the manufacturer, the Karlskrona Shipyard. However, the situation has tightened up considerably, DAGENS NYHETER has been told. The United States was supposed to have bought 20 large wind power plants, but has now backed out of the deal. The future outlook is also precarious in Sweden.

It had been understood in principle that the United States would buy 20 large plants for Hawaii—an order which would mean several hundred million krona for the Karlskrona Shipyard and would secure jobs for 50 to 100 workers.

Now the situation is precarious. The negotiations with the United States have been broken off. The whole matter broke down on the question of finance. The reasons were the huge decline of the oil prices which has made wind power plants unprofitable for the United States, and the increased costs brought about by high interest rates. The future of wind power plants is also insecure in Sweden. The politicians will make the decision whether to build more windmills, by 1984 at the earliest. By then, the results of the test period in Maglarp will be known, as will those from Gotland which will soon have a similar large wind power plant. The future also depends on whether it is decided to retain the considerably cheaper nuclear power.

Reserves

One thousand large wind power plants like the Maglarp project are needed just to replace the Barseback nuclear plant, and also there must be power in reserve for calm days. The costs of developing the Maglarp project are well over 100 million krona, says Per Olf Ebkom of Sydkraft, the project director, who has been chosen to be the manager of the plant.

In the future mass production must reduce the price per plant to 18 million krona if the project is to be profitable, Ekbom thinks. The prototype involved lots of additional expenses.

The dimensions of the Maglarp project are impressive. On Soderslatt it is already called the 'Big Mill.'

It has really given a new profile to the gentle landscape which was once dotted with old windmills.

The Mill

Actually, such an old Scanian mill is still standing in Skegrie, a short distance from Maglarp. It will be a marvelous contrast!

The Maglarp plant will be 80 meters high, and with the rotor (the 'propeller') in vertical position, 120 meters. It will be a formidable lift that will begin and possibly be finished by Sunday night. The engine, including the rotor and the tower, weighs almost 500 tons.

First, the engine and the rotor are hauled up in a huge lifting ramp that has been built. It looks like Cape Kennedy; except that the "spaceship," the wind power plant is not supposed to take off. The tower will be added when the engine has been elevated to a height of 35 meters. The great lift on Soderslatt has become a public event. Many thousand visitors have come to Maglarp in the sweltering sun of the early summer.

Full Output

At a wind velocity between 14 and 27 meters a second, the full capacity of the Maglarp plant will be utilized. At 27 meters a second the plant will be stopped for reasons of safety. It starts at 6 meters a second. The highest output is 3,000 kilowatts.

A similar windmill, the only one bought by the United States so far, will have an output of 4,000 kilowatts, due to a different voltage, among other things. The U.S. mill will be built in a couple of months.

So the Maglarp windmill will be the largest in the world for only a short time. But Maglarp may for a long, long time remain the second largest in the world, unless the oil price increases drastically.....

The really big lift for the Swedish wind power industry seems to be far away. In any event, however, the test period will begin in Maglarp by midsummer.

9892

CSO: 3109/165

LABOR UNIONS OF ALPINE REGIONS MEET

Rome LAVORO ITALIANO in Italian 7-13 Jun 82 p 15

[Text] The workers of the alpine regions, their problems and the territory on which they operate were the subject of a meeting organized by the unified trade union federation of Lombardy which, in addition to representatives from the seven regions bordering on the Alps, was also attended by representatives of the German (DGB), Austrian (OeGB [Austrian Trade Union Federation]) and Swiss (SGB [Swiss Trade Union Federation] from Graubunden and CHG [expansion unknown] from Ticino) trade unions.

The representatives of the trade union federations from the seven alpine regions met at the Chamber of Commerce of Varese on 27 and 28 May 1982 to discuss the problems of the workers of the central Alps.

At the invitation of the CGIL, CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] of Lombardy, the representatives of the DGB of Bavaria, the OeGB of the Tirol, the Swiss trade union federation (SGB) of Graubunden, the Christian National Confederation (CNG) of Ticino and the representatives of the CGIL-CISL-UIL federation of Trentino-Alto Adige met.

At the beginning of the session, Jean Francois Petitbon, the director of the press and information division of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), spoke of the interest with which the EEC had learned of the unions' intention to move forward, within their own area, toward a Europe of the workers by taking practical steps in that direction.

Dr Vittorio Curzi, who is the head of the Regional Policy Division of the EEC, spoke in detail of the objectives, methods and limitations of the EEC's regional policy, which aims, above all, at improving the living and working conditions of the workers in the mountainous and border regions.

In the lively discussion which took place, the representatives of the unions criticized the ARGEALP's [expansion unknown] of the regional governments for not supplying sufficient information in response to the requirements and applicable to the interests of the workers.

Emilio Zeni, the CGIL-CISL-UIL of Lombardy's regional secretary, spoke about the situation of the workers in the alpine regions and requested, among other things, that in the future the the ARGEALP's of the regional governments would take not only the interests of the entrepreneurs and their companies into

account but also those of the workers and their unions. Only if that is done will it be possible to find satisfactory solutions for problems concerned with work, unemployment, traffic, housing, energy policy, the advancement of the mountainous areas and possibilities for the utilization of free time. Jakob Deffner, the president of the DGB of Bavaria, stressed the importance of developing a program in the alpine regions of all the countries concerned to make sure, on the one hand, that the workers would have access to skilled jobs in their areas of origin, and that, on the other hand, the need to preserve the natural beauties of the Alps would be taken into consideration.

The representatives of all the trade union federations that were present agreed on the need to develop the economies of all the alpine regions in accordance with specific programs, and in order to accomplish that purpose they requested that more information be furnished by the ARGEALP's of the regional governments to the union organizations regarding their programs and an institutional involvement of the unions in the decisions which concern them.

The trade union organizations agreed to constitute two work groups to investigate the problems. Those work groups will work out joint proposals in the field of economic and social policy which will be submitted for approval at the next plenary assembly of the trade union ARGEALP.

9258

CSO: 3104/238

an "alternative parliamentary force" alongside the extra-parliamentary movement. Among the specific demands included in the program of the Hessian Greens are the abolition of the 5-percent provision in elections; the "openness and opening-up of all decision-making processes;" admission of the public to cabinet meetings; voting rights for foreigners in communal elections, and a number of changes in the Hessian communal ordinance. These include institution of a question period for citizens in the communal assemblies and the right of the public to speak to all agenda items. The party, which claims to have 2,500 members in Hesse by its own count, also proposes the holding of plebiscites, if 10 percent of all eligible voters desire it.

The Hessian Greens propose to influence policy at the federal level by issuing "parliamentary guidances" on the votes to be cast by the Land government in the Bundesrat. Constitutional changes at the Land and federal level could only be adopted by referendum. Their final demand calls for "complete disclosure" of earnings by all parliamentarians and for the "priority principle" to apply to "grass roots" decisions. Any Landtag fraction of theirs, the Greens say, would not only point out "political alternatives" by submitting proposals or questions and voting on them but also "clarify" their stand by "taking action."

Ms Schilling, listed second on the Hessian Greens' ballot for the 26 September Landtag election, was received by Qadhafi in the Libyan capital of Tripoli last week along with a number of other German environmentalists and peace movement supporters. The Greens' national executive committee has distanced itself from the meeting and spokesmen of the Hessian Land organization called the meeting a "purely private one." Ms Schilling was told prior to her trip, they said, that the Greens did not maintain any contacts to the governments of foreign countries either at the national or the Land level.

9478
CSO: 3103/603

GREEN PARTY SEEKS CHANGES IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Jul 82, pp 1,2

[Text] Wiesbaden, 27 July—The Greens in Hesse do not wish to abolish the FRG's parliamentary system, but they do want to make "fundamental" changes. This statement contained in its Land program was the environmental party's response in Wiesbaden on Tuesday to reports according to which its Landtag candidate Gertrud Schilling was supposed to have said during a visit with Libyan chief of state Qadhafi that the Greens wished to abolish parliamentary democracy.

Meanwhile, the Greens' national chairman Petra Kelly, in an interview with NUERNBERGER NACHRICHTEN, rejected the accusation that the Greens are pursuing anti-parliamentary goals. "It is not our business to abolish parliament," Ms Kelly said. But, she added, the Greens did wish to make "the system of parliamentary democracy more transparent and give it more credibility." They want to see "the citizenry decide down to the lowest level" and would like to "change the parliaments, if need be, working within the system of parliamentary democracy." They would want to experiment with new methods there, including non-violent protest. "I could very well imagine a hunger strike taking place in a parliament for instance," Ms Kelly said, "if it were a question of survival like the deployment of nuclear missiles." The Greens, she added, wanted to do "good parliamentary work" and accept responsibility as long as "questions of survival" were not watered down; but they did not wish to take part in an "old and decrepit power structure." The Greens, she said, were not ready to make concessions on basic issues such as non-violence, rejection of nuclear energy and existing military policies as well as on the environment but were ready to talk about other "lesser demands." If the "established parties" were ready to discuss the ecological demands, the possibility of cooperating with them would definitely exist.

Hessian Greens spokesmen listed among their aims changes in representative democracy with a view to achieving "self-determination and self-administration by those concerned in decentralized, surveyable living spaces." The party did not wish to abolish parliament but to effect a "democratic opening of the parliaments to put an end to the vaingloriousness of the parliamentarians." Representative democracy as practiced up to now did not offer the citizens any opportunity for influence and control. In order that the public did not lose out in parliamentary decisions, there was a need for

PEACE MOVEMENT, GREEN PARTY MEMBERS MEET WITH QADHDHAFI

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jul 82 p 4

[Article by "ban": "Ms Schilling Wants To Abolish Parliaments"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 July—Some (including leading) supporters of the "peace movement" and members of the Greens spent one week in Libya in early July and met with chief of state Qadhafi twice while they were there. A report which appeared in the leftwing TAZ was confirmed by one of the travelers on Thursday. Among those meeting with Qadhafi were peace researcher Mechttersheimer; the Greens' Hessian Landtag candidate Gertrud Schilling; Green national executive committee member Vogt and Berlin lawyer Schily, a member of the "Alternative List." Also attending were members of the "peace movement" from several West European countries.

The Green party in Bonn was at pains on Thursday to dispel the notion that the trip had been taken by an official party delegation. Greens executive director Beckmann said the trip had neither been mentioned, nor discussed by any of the party's executive bodies. Ms Schilling and Vogt did not speak for the Greens' executive committee in Tripoli. The trip was intended as a continuation of the contacts of the West European "peace movement" to Libya. A conversation already took place in March on the fringes of the Qadhafi visit to Vienna. The common interest of the participants appears to lie in the prevention of the deployment of NATO medium range missiles in Sicily close to Libya. Vogt, for example, views these weapons as not only being directed against the Soviets' medium range capability but also against the African continent. This assessment of his is shared by the Libyan leader. Another common concern, mentioned by Schily, was the desire to be independent of the superpowers and their blocs.

There is a possibility of similar meetings taking place in the future. In this connection the "peace movement," it was said, was not angling for financial support by Libya, even if Libya itself often tries to give that impression. A TAZ reporter who was present at the meetings quotes Ms Schilling as saying "it is the Greens' goal to abolish all parliaments or, in other words, to put direct democracy into practice." Citing Libyan people's congresses, she said they were thinking along similar lines. "We wish to throw the power game of the political parties out of balance and destroy it."

On the other hand, the Germans attending the meeting also tried to keep their distance from Libyan policies. Ms Schilling, for example, pointed out that the Greens, as distinct from Qadhafi, were against "military defense policy" and were interested in developing "alternative methods of defense." They also appear to have some second thoughts with regard to suppression of the political opposition in Libya. But the TAZ reporter does conclude that the visitors "wanted to do right" by their hosts—"at times too much so, it seems to me and in the final analysis not just for the sake of politeness."

9478

CSO: 3103/601

HONECKER EXPECTS CONCESSIONS FROM FRG IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Jul 82 pp 39-42

[Unattributed article: "Whether It Makes Sense"]

[Text] SED chief Honecker sent word to chancellor Schmidt that it was now Bonn's turn to make concessions in inner-German relations.

Erich Honecker took 4 weeks to compose his lengthy reply.

On 24 May, when Hans-Otto Braeutigam, Bonn's new representative in East Berlin, presented his credentials he brought with him a message from Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the chairman of the GDR Council of State. In it, he told Honecker that Bonn was ready and willing to contribute further to inner-German normalization in the spirit of the Werbellin summit meeting. Schmidt also expressed the hope that the GDR would do its part to help resolve outstanding problems—above all the minimum currency exchange provision.

Honecker did not receive the Bonn representative again until 22 June, shortly after agreement had been reached on a moderate reduction of the no-interest overdraft credit for the GDR in inner-German trade.

Honecker told Braeutigam to relay to Schmidt that the GDR's interest in good relations continued unchanged but that real normalization did call for Bonn's acceding to the demand that the GDR be accorded equal status to all other nations according to international law.

Honecker then went on to enumerate the steps the GDR had taken since the December summit at Lake Werbellin to improve relations. Some of them were major ones—such as additions to the list of urgent family affairs in case of which GDR citizens would be permitted to travel to West Germany. But there were petty matters, too, such as that FRG visitors on a lengthier sojourn to the GDR would not have to register with the police until the third day instead of immediately upon arrival.

There were some in Bonn who called the 1½-page list "small-minded." They also poked fun at Honecker for turning a familiar adage around and referring to "take and give" and one of the chancellor's advisers noted that the message from East Berlin contained "absolutely nothing new."

Other political figures concerned with inner-German relations are pointing to restrictions on East Berlin's freedom of action, to consequences of the Polish crisis and Moscow's growing irritation with the policies of the American government. By drawing up this list containing GDR concessions be they ever so small, the SED chief, they say, meant to demonstrate how strong his interest in good inner-German relations is despite all existing difficulties. More than that was simply not possible at this time.

There is some evidence for the correctness of this interpretation. For one thing, the number of travelers in urgent family matters has really increased a good deal.

But decisive proof of GDR good will is still outstanding as far as the FRG government is concerned. Bonn has told the GDR again and again that it must modify the minimum exchange levels at least for pensioners and children before there could be any question of the kind of "inner balance" necessary for further progress in inner-German negotiations.

But the chances for things to get back on track are slight, since Moscow is pressuring its allies to cut down on Western influences by pointing to the Polish example.

West German diplomats in East Berlin are finding to their great dismay that Soviet functionaries have now joined SED specialists in floating rumors on possible variations of minimum exchange levels. There is talk of reductions for the destitute with all other visitors to the GDR being asked to make even greater payments than at present.

There is another formula being bruited about in East Berlin according to which exchanges for short-term visitors are to be drastically increased and lowered in graduated fashion for those staying longer. "This would affect the most important part of inner-German travel," said a member of the chancellor's office, "and would bring on a very strong reaction on the part of the FRG government."

Other SED spokesmen have recently been linking the high exchange levels to Honecker's demands for recognition. Why, they say, should the GDR meet Bonn halfway on minimum currency exchange, if Bonn is not willing to move on the status issue.

But the FRG is not prepared to go along with this "politico-psychological linkage." Disagreement concerning a special relationship between the two German states as well as GDR demands for recognition under international law, the West says, was expressly noted at the time the basic treaty was signed.

The SED regime in fact knows only too well that the FRG government is neither able, nor willing to shift its position on recognizing GDR citizenship or on altering the status of the permanent representations and turning them into embassies. The GDR is therefore exerting even stronger pressure on Bonn to make concessions in the Elbe borderline dispute.

If only for practical-political reasons, the FRG government is inclined to agree to have the border run in the middle of the river, as East Berlin has asked. Perusal of additional Allied postwar documents in the meantime has shown, according to one familiar with the complicated subject matter, "that the British, too, as the responsible occupying power, began to view this borderline as the correct one from a certain time onward."

Everything now hinges on the Minister President of Lower Saxony, Ernst Albrecht, who has always held that the border runs along the east bank of the river. 2 months ago, Schmidt asked Albrecht to review his position carefully in the light of hitherto unknown or unregarded documents.

But Albrecht has not made a reply thus far. Socialist-liberal politicians concerned with inner-German issues suspect that the prime minister may be holding on the Elbe border issue as an ace up his sleeve in case the CDU/CSU takes over the government. "Some day, the GDR may be sorry it made such an issue of the Elbe border," one Bonn diplomat said, "because the CDU/CSU is bound to ask a stiff price for making a concession on the matter."

Perhaps Erich Honecker is well aware of this and may for his part be holding back on travel concessions for much the same reason. In fact, it is well known in Bonn that East Berlin is quite soberly preparing for a change of government in Bonn.

It is up to the FRG government, to be sure, to come up with concrete suggestions for a return visit by Honecker as agreed upon at Werbellin but as for "signals indicating urgency on the chairman's part, there have not been any in the recent past," a member of the chancellor's inner circle notes.

Such a sign would not really gibe with the assessment the SED chief came up with in front of a small group. The state the coalition is in, Honecker said, poses the question "whether it makes any sense to invest any more effort."

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CSO: 3103/599

POLLS SHOW CDU WITH ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN HESSE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by "ban": "SPD and FDP Combined at 40 Percent, Polls Say"]

[Text] Bonn, 28 July—Prior to the start of the election campaign in Hesse, SPD and FDP are worriedly watching the results of recent polls particularly in view of the continuing disputes within the Bonn coalition. The polls all say that SPD and FDP combined attain just 40 percent of the vote with the CDU/CSU getting an absolute majority and the Greens, ahead of the FDP as they already were in the Lower Saxony and Hamburg regional elections, more and more taking over from them as a "third" party. All the polling institutes are also pointing to still another threat to the FDP: the party comes in at just about the 5 percent mark. Only one institute has the FDP getting 7 percent of the vote. It is for the FDP above all that there may be consequences arising from the polls dealing with the upcoming Hessian election. Bonn sources say that the party's fortunes "rose" to 7 percent following the Darmstadt resolution to join the CDU in a coalition. In the course of the campaign, the Hessian voters would now have to be convinced that they might get things moving nationally beyond the confines of their own Land. The "Hesse model"—which is what the 26 September election is being called—could have an impact on other Laender as well as on Bonn in 1984 at the latest, these sources say. But if the FDP makes a bad showing in Hesse, then the supporters of the "socialist-liberal" coalition might come out on top in the intraparty dispute. That is why the Bonn FDP leadership attaches such crucial political importance to this Land election—a point to be impressed upon the voters as well. The polls restricted to Hesse itself seem to indicate that this should not be too difficult.

At the same time, the FDP says there are indications for an upward trend throughout the country. The party points to a poll conducted by the Allensbach Institute on behalf of CAPITAL magazine which was made public in Bonn on Wednesday. When the so-called Sunday question was asked, the poll says, the FDP came in at only 5.1 percent—its worst showing by far during the past 6 years. After hovering around the 10-percent mark from the fall of 1980, the date of the last Bundestag election until late last year, the party has lost support ever since, Allensbach says. The Infas Institute findings offer but limited hope to the FDP in that it rose by one percentage point to 6.5 during the past several weeks. A countrywide Emnid poll gives the FDP 7 percent in July. Only the CDU/CSU and the Greens can draw real

satisfaction from the polls. Allensbach has had the CDU/CSU coming in at more than 49 percent since the beginning of the year and at more than 53 percent during June and July. For this same period, both Infas and Emnid registered 51 percent for the CDU/CSU. One reason for this, pollster Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann says, is that the CDU/CSU appears far less disunited in the eyes of the voters than the SPD and the FDP.

This view also appears to gain ground among the coalition parties themselves. They are above all beginning to doubt the value of the flood of interviews appearing on the weekends. The Allensbach Institute has the SPD coming in at less than 35 percent for every month since the beginning of the year and the trend is still down. The figures for June and July, as given by Ms Noelle-Neumann, are 31.1 and 31.4 percent respectively. The Emnid figure of 34 percent is only marginally better. Only Infas presented two polls during the past few weeks which come out at 37 percent for the SPD. At SPD headquarters, people are inclined to doubt the accuracy of these figures, however. In an election campaign, they say, many things can change, if supporters and voters are mobilized. But such hopes, which SPD chairman Brandt is fond of voicing, would seem to conflict with the actual outcome of the Hamburg election where SPD polling institutes forecast a far better showing than really occurred.

9478

CSO: 3103/604

PCI'S NAPOLITANO REVIEWS POLITICAL SCENE

PM291035 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25-26 Jul 82 p 3

[Undated interview with PCI Secretariat member Giorgio Napolitano by Giorhio Rossi: "Neither With Craxi Nor With De Mita"]

[Text] Rome--[Question] Deputy Napolitano, your latest directorate session prompted a spate of speculations: That a split had occurred within the PCI leadership, that [PCI Secretary General] Berlinguer was in a minority, that another swing had taken place....

[Answer] They are all absurd fabrications. We discussed the work to be started to prepare for the congress, bearing in mind, of course, the developments in the political situation. But perhaps some people did not realize until they read last Tuesday's [20 July] communique that we "are moving"; some are surprised by it, some are worried about it.

[Question] There is no doubt, however, that your directorate communique is formulated in such a way as to leave broad scope for the most varied interpretations. For instance, it talks generically about "leftwing forces" without explicitly naming the PSI, as you usually do; and the democratic alternative is not even mentioned. Does all this not mean anything?

[Answer] We decided, in what was not even a directorate resolution but simply a press communique, not to repeat all the elements of our political stance. There were no calculated omissions. But perhaps some people failed to understand that we do not intend to limit ourselves to indicating the more or less distant objective of the democratic alternative, but intend to work harder than ever to influence the evolution of the present situation and to bring that objective closer.

Open Debate

[Question] So everything is calm within the directorate. But within the PCI there are different, often very different political stances, which you will have to submit to the congress for example in the spring. Would you care to specify what these stances are?

[Answer] Irrespective of the discussions of a year ago or thereabouts, what is certain is that we, as a leadership group, are motivated by the desire to deal seriously with the problems of the party's initiative and political future, in preparation for the congress, with the utmost commitment to unity. If differing opinions emerge on the various problems, we will compare them in this spirit, attempting to reach a real synthesis.

[Question] What do you mean: "If differing opinions emerge...? They already exist--and on fundamental issues.

[Answer] We do not intend--any of us--to proceed from preestablished positions. It is therefore really necessary to gradually establish in this regard what will be the points for comparison with regard to the themes of the congress. Meanwhile we are preparing for the September Central Committee session.

[Question] So, Deputy Napolitano, let us just say that there are within the Communist Party at least two issues on which differing opinions exist: Relations with the PSI and the "break" with the USSR. Would you care to explain to us the nature of these differences and how they are felt within the party?

[Answer] In the party grassroots there is a debate on both these issues, involving various attitudes and states of mind, but in a very open and fluid way. I consider the phenomenon of crystallized stances opposed to those of the Central Committee on international matters a marginal one. As far as relations with the PSI are concerned, there is a reflection of the very preoccupying contradictions, which nobody denies, between greater unity on the left and the serious difficulties stemming from certain forms of conduct on the PSI's part. We believe, however, that the fundamental issue is to devote our forces more and more to real action, to an initiative relating to the specific problems, within a policy of movement.

[Question] Greater unity on the left with a view to the democratic alternative? This may well be your aim, but [PSI Secretary General] Craxi, as he repeated recently on television, considers it impracticable.

[Answer] I believe that the political experience of recent months has been very significant. The present government coalition has failed to guarantee a greater degree of governability either of public finance or of the economy as a whole, and even the question of the functioning and renewal of the institutions has gradually been shelved. Furthermore, as the PSI has clashed with the DC, not purely on matters of power but on matters concerning the approach to economic and social policy, the essential role of the PCI in any change and development in the direction of reform and progress has emerged. Craxi cannot fail to reflect on this experience.

[Question] Pardon me, but in what way has "the PCI's essential role" emerged?

[Answer] For instance, we were the first to state that the prevailing line within the government on economic policy was leading to recession and

increased unemployment, was socially inequitable and left the structural causes of inflation intact. When the socialists, and even Minister La Malfa, acknowledged it and asserted the need to change this policy, they realized that it is impossible to overcome the DC's resistance without a quest for convergence with the communists. Some people are realizing that we cannot be allotted the role of supporting one of the two sides into which the majority is split. We are committed and have our own viewpoint on the problems and our own positions. At least partial convergences can be achieved between these positions and those of the forces within the majority; but the PCI does not follow the policies of others: It works to promote new political processes.

[Question] The directorate communique talks about "starting a new political process based on a constructive and unprejudiced dialogue." Some people have seen this as an overture to the DC, and [DC Deputy Secretary] Galloni, writing in IL POPOLO, appreciated the expression. What did you mean by it?

[Answer] First, there must be no prejudices against the PCI....

Sacrifices and Reforms

[Question] The DC denies that there are any prejudices and talks solely in terms of a political option.

[Answer] The present DC leaders claim to hope that an alternative to the country's leadership is possible but add that--irrespective of the opportunity for the PSI and the other leftwing and nonconfessional forces to declare themselves in favor of an alliance with the PCI--an alternative cannot yet be envisaged because the communists have not completed their "evolutionary process." It seems clear, therefore, that to some extent the prejudice does survive.

[Question] But there is your prejudice too--the "moral" line against the DC.

[Answer] We challenge the DC's leading role partly because of the inability it has hitherto displayed to make a commitment to moral and institutional reform: It is enough to cite the DC's persistent reticence on the Cirillo case and--though the responsibility here is not entirely the DC's--the attempt a few days ago to shelve the reform of committees of inquiry. But we have no prejudices with regard to the quest for points of contact even with the DC on matters of vital importance to democracy and peace. This is separate from the future government that we are pursuing which is, I repeat, an alternative based on renewed unity among the leftwing forces.

[Question] What is not quite clear is whether or not the DC can be part of this alternative government too.

[Answer] We have talked about the alternative from the viewpoint of its contents and government methods and also from the viewpoint of the social alignments within the country. From the viewpoint of political alignments,

we did not intend to use the alternative as a synonym for a national unity government. The hypothesis is therefore a government without the DC.

[Question] Deputy Napolitano, let us forget about alignments and look at specifics. You are opposed to [Prime Minister] Spadolini's economic policy but, if you were in the government now, would you too not consider a policy of sacrifices a necessity?

[Answer] We would choose to do what, since the democratic solidarity phase, governments have decided not to do. That is, a policy of revising and reforming the mechanisms that have caused disruption in public finance, high inflation rates and recession.

Trade Union Splits

[Question] Such an economic policy could yield results in the long term. But how would you deal immediately with a deficit of over 70 trillion lire?

[Answer] We have already pointed to measures for revising the fiscal system, welfare reform, a revision of health spending machinery and others, which could yield results as soon as 1983. We have also pointed to measures that could produce results in the coming months. For instance, an extraordinary tax on real estate and large accumulations of wealth. But one cannot argue every year, on the eve of the August public holiday, that it is necessary to find trillions of lire right away and that there is no time to prepare a longer-term plan. By doing that one is ensuring that this time will never come and the problems will be exacerbated.

Furthermore, the DC is basically trying to impose sacrifices on industrial workers without affecting--or affecting as little as possible--other sectors with higher incomes and privileged positions. Last, any demand for sacrifices must be properly aimed at providing a new thrust to investments and employment. Above all, this is an essential point in relations with the trade unions.

[Question] There is a profound division and the danger of a split within the trade unions on these very issues.

[Answer] We are very worried about the divergences among the federations and the tendency of some Italian Confederation of Labor Unions and Italian Union of Labor leaders to exacerbate them. We are witnessing the very clear emergence of positions which a month ago did not seem to constitute insuperable causes of conflict. Having said that, the conclusion of the Trade Union Confederation's Secretariat was not negative. Major points of agreement were confirmed, while the quest continues on other points. It seems to me that many people, including the press, are exerting pressure in the direction of a rupture. Whom would it benefit? Not even, I believe, the sector of the employers organizations which is still rational.

EDITORIAL URGES EUROPEAN UNITY FOR WORLD PEACE

PM290957 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25-26 Jul 82 pp 1-2

[Editorial by Eugenio Scalfari: "Europe Is Moving: Where Is Italy?"]

[Text] The nature of the Europe-U.S. clash is now fairly clear-cut: France and Germany, with their affairs in good order with regard to the measures to restore the military balance in the European theater, refuse to submit to Washington's directives on economic sanctions against the USSR. Above all, they refuse to be ordered to pursue a policy decided on elsewhere, not only "without" but also "despite" the opinions expressed in regard to it by the Paris and Bonn governments.

The Siberian gas pipeline issue is the visible but certainly not the only manifestation of this dispute, which has now entered an acute phase. Reagan has vetoed the construction of that vast infrastructure so that he can arrive at the summit meeting with Brezhnev with the maximum bargaining power. But the Europeans will not be at that summit meeting; they will not take part in compiling its agenda; and they will have no effective say with regard to the preparations for or conduct of the negotiations.

At a time when the United States is witnessing the greatest diminution of its world leadership, the U.S. president, in other words, is presuming to treat the EEC countries not very differently from the way he treats the states of the union. Indeed, the foreign, strategic, monetary and commercial policies of Texas, Massachusetts, Virginia and South Dakota are laid down in Washington: Presumably the same is intended to apply to the FRG, France, Britain and Italy--with the not insignificant difference that at least the inhabitants of Texas, Virginia and South Dakota vote every 4 years in presidential elections, where as we Europeans obviously do not.

The socialist and "Atlanticist" Mitterrand has dug in his heels over the gas pipeline. The socialist Schmidt has done the same. Meanwhile another dispute has blown up over the issue of EC steel imports. A third cause of EC-U.S. disagreement is about to emerge over credits and low interest rates granted to Eastern bloc countries. A fourth (and here we are outside the sphere of strictly commercial matters) has been looming for some time in connection with the Middle East and the Palestinian war.

The question that we must now ask is this: Why have these long-latent causes of dispute within the Western alliance surfaced now, and all together? Why, in the words used in this paper yesterday by Barbara Spinelli, has an international situation that a few months ago seemed to bristle with difficulties for Moscow and its empire now become an outright "West-West" crisis?

This apparent paradox is not difficult to explain. In a world increasingly difficult for the superpowers to control and increasingly multipolar, the idea and necessity of Europe as a political entity could not fail to be evoked by the vacuum in the institutional structures. In a world in which Israel acts with complete autonomy, Argentina tries to be a law unto itself, Iraq and Iran initiate a war very dangerous to the oil-producing Gulf area, Mexico is emerging more and more from the U.S. orbit, Japan is for the first time examining the issue of its own national armament and South Africa pursues its interests without allowing itself to be influenced by the West's antiracist leadership; in such a tumultuous and increasingly decentralized world, is it conceivable that Europe can continue to remain silent, disunited and dependent in everything and for everything on big brother's say-so?

The answer would never have come--and indeed never did come--from academic meetings. It is emerging now from the political reality, which exerts much more pressure than a hundred sessions of the European Parliament or of the EEC Council of Ministers. What hitherto seemed like commercial disagreements limited to the world of experts have become a political conflict, and it is this conflict that constitutes the baptismal font for Europe's birth.

In a sense, it is relatively unimportant whether on the subject of the Siberian gas pipeline or other similar cases Reagan's arguments may be as valid as Mitterrand's or Schmidt's. The important thing is to define, by examining these issues, a shared European will which must inevitably be followed by further content and by institutions capable of creating a European profile, a European foreign policy, a European economy.

It is to be hoped that our continent's governments will not ignore the fact that sooner rather than later they will be confronted with the problem of a joint European defense too. The minor war in the Falklands has provided some valuable lessons in this regard, moreover.

The present divergence of opinion between France and Germany on the one hand and the United States on the other can therefore very easily constitute--and indeed, in our opinion already does constitute--the antecedent to a continental political will. Quite irrespective of the particular case, the recent economic sanctions decreed by the EEC, at Britain's request, against Argentina over the attack on the Falklands were of similar value. And political and economic deterrent measures taken by the EEC against Israel's aggressive policy would have been, and would be, even more valuable.

So we were not mistaken when we wrote, in the days immediately following Reagan's election to the White House, that if the new president stood by his election platform it would become increasingly difficult to merge Atlanticism and Europeanism into a single binding term, as if they were synonyms, and that on the contrary there would be an increasingly clear distinction in the countries of our continent between pro-Americans and pro-Europeans, mutually "agreeing to disagree."

At that time we were variously and openly criticized for saying such things and, of course, labeled pro-Soviet, neutralists and anti-American. We were shown the example of the socialist Mitterrand, apparently so orthodox and loyal in his defense of a 24-carat Atlanticism.

We...what has happened to those zealous critics, faced now with such a predictable--and predicted--situation, which reflects not ideological infatuations but the substantial weight of interests, revived and elevated by profound and ancient ideological convictions?

Unfortunately it must be said that the Italian Government--the present one, like all its predecessors--is deaf to these issues, despite the decisive relevance to our future.

We were almost alone in deploring Italy's desertion of Europe during the Falklands crisis, motivated certainly not by anti-Argentine or anti-Third World sectarianism but by a clear perception of the importance for Europe to align united against an attack on one of its most important members.

There is all the more reason for us now to deplore the hesitant and incomprehensible Italian stance on the subject of the Siberian gas pipeline. The very fact that our government is begging Moscow for more and more postponements of the signing of the agreement (the latest extension lapses in September) betrays the belief of the Chigi Palace [prime minister's office] and the Farnesina [Foreign Ministry] that that signing must inevitably take place. But the intention is obviously to avoid, while the EEC-U.S. dispute rages, having to choose sides between the Americans and the Europeans. Prudence and wisdom are feigned where there is only hesitancy, timidity and a failure to perceive our real interests as a European nation.

Our diligent [Prime Minister] Spadolini misses no opportunity when traveling a' road to rail against the international summit meetings from which we are often excluded. But in order to take any more than an ornamental part in them we would have to have something to say and really want to say it. Hitherto this has almost never happened.

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NEW AUTONOMOUS LABOR CONFEDERATION HOLDS FIRST CONGRESS

Autonomous Trade Unionism

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 10 Jun 82 pp 10-11, 47

[Article by Francesco Cascioli: "Autonomous Trade Unionism: A Phenomenon Which Should Not Be Underestimated"]

[Text] The sliding scale is not untouchable. The combination of three trade union federations consisting of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and the UIL [Italian Union of Labor] is an example of a totalizing dogmatic culture. With these beliefs, autonomous trade unionism is asserting itself. And it is benefiting from the mistakes and the carelessness of the federated trade unions.

The first congress of the CONFISAL [Confederation of Autonomous Labor Unions] which took place in late May provides an opportunity to examine the phenomenon of autonomous trade unionism in Italy.

This is a type of trade unionism which, while accusing the CGIL-CISL-UIL of being actively ideological unions, accepts members on the basis of a specific ideological choice either on the cultural level or in regard to attitudes toward labor. On the cultural level, one learns, from reading the speech of Vigano, the secretary of the UNSA [National Union of Autonomous Labor Unions], that our system is "prolific in the production of lies," that "the weakness of the state magnifies the aberrant and unbecoming phenomenon of charging individuals with crime anonymously and of indulging in calumny" and that "we need to return to a society where the family performs its normal function and there is a taste for orderliness, which constitutes an integral part of the common patrimony of CONFISAL." The ideological aspect of the positions taken by autonomous trade unionism with respect to labor is based entirely on a reappraisal of professionalism. As Papadia of the CGIL's government employees office explains, by comparison with a union bound by contracts, which is able to attack all aspects of the organization of labor, the autonomous unions take aim at the "ineluctability of the law" (here, then, is their polemic against vested interests), at appeals to the TAR [expansion unknown], and at the myriad of laws Parliament has produced on government employment, and they are desirous of raising the social and economic status of government employees, and they can do this because only government employees on the medium and upper levels

belong to them." Since it is a competent union specializing in specific counterthrusts, it plans disputes and puts forward specific claims linked with certain groups of employees--a tactic which the federated union finds it difficult to oppose. The engineers or the engine-shed chiefs of the railroads, situated as they are at key points in the rail transportation system, are typical examples in this regard, for there is a limited number of these individuals, they are highly qualified and they constitute a powerful force where drawing up labor contracts is concerned. Since it does not represent all the workers in one branch of industry, autonomous trade unionism is not able to work out comprehensive platforms. With respect to legislation concerning reforming government employment, the only known CONFESAL position has to do with Article 8, which recognizes the "most representative federations" as representing the workers. What CONFESAL fears is that it will not be recognized as such; it does not know how to go any farther than that. Nevertheless, one should have been able to expect something better from a federation with a majority of government employees--a comprehensive project on government employment or a well-put-together proposal on reforming the administration of the government--tasks which CONFESAL does not know how to do, cannot do or perhaps does not want to do. Gullotta, the secretary of SNALS [National Autonomous Labor Union of School Workers], states that the "guiding force of this era is the individual, not the masses," and that consequently the difficulty he encounters lies in holding small groups individuals together and getting them to act as federations. So having brought nine unions of Finance Ministry employees together under a single, new appellation is considered a great victory. Uniting the five unions of employees of the local entities in a single, autonomous trade union, etc., is being proposed again. The objective of CONFESAL, then, becomes that of unifying its forces, qualifying itself as a federation (one of the accusations most frequently brought against the autonomous unions is that they do not get acceptance of their decisions by all their members, from the highest to the lowest ranking) and training cadres who will know how to implement these processes of mediation and unification. Affiliation with international trade unions such as the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions], which ought not to be hard, is a separate problem, but joining the ETUC [European Trade Union Confederation] will be more difficult.

At a moment of weakness of federation trade unionism, CONFESAL is becoming a phenomenon which should not be underestimated. Some mistakes and misapprehensions on the part of the union movement have already become the favorite targets of the autonomists, and particularly in connection with government employment. That is the case in regard to the precedent-setting unification of government employees and those working in private industry on liquidations or to the turning over of pension funds (which concern categories where the autonomists are strong) to the INPS [National Social Security Institute] to restore the administration of the agricultural pension fund (the smallest pensions) and the fund for the Integration Chest to a healthy condition by moving them to the black-ink side of the ledger. Those will be the points on which CONFESAL will attempt to unify its scattered and diversified forces, seeking points of joint vindication which will justify its efforts to present itself to the public as a federation.

The alternative to paying more attention to the problems of the workers who are more likely to be influenced by the autonomists would be for the federated unions to represent themselves loosely as the trade union of the poor, the mass of laborers or unskilled workers--the union of the lowest categories of employees. With the attention paid to the phenomenon by the cadres, and especially after the march of the 40,000 in Torino, and with the success of the April congress of the government employees section of the CGIL, the CGIL-CISL-UIL has already rejected the choice of that alternative. Permitting a trade union which asserts that "the sliding scale is not untouchable" and accuses "the three trade unions of constituting a totalizing dogmatic culture" may be a very serious mistake whose consequences may weigh heavily on the future of the Italian trade union movement and already are undermining its representativeness and its power in collective bargaining.

What Is the CONFISAL?

The CONFISAL came into being as an attempt to bring a good 445 autonomous trade unions together in a single federation. The first attempt at unification was the agreement arrived at by SNALS [National Autonomous Labor Union of School Workers], UNSA [National Union of Autonomous Labor Unions], CISAS [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions of Employees of Health and Social Services] and CISAL [Italian Confederation of Autonomous Labor Unions], but it was unsuccessful. Now UNSA and SNALS are trying to function as a rallying point by themselves, while CISAS and CISAL have assumed a watching and waiting attitude vis-a-vis the newborn federation. The CONFISAL will be managed by a board of directors consisting of six people: two from UNSA, two from SNALS, one from the autonomous federation of transportation workers and one from the UNAMS [expansion unknown] show. The general coordinator is Michele Tricarico of SNALS.

CONFISAL has announced that it represents 610,000 members in all, with 170,000 of them being members of SNALS. The data of the Schools CGIL correct the figure on SNALS to 100,000 members, and then, reducing the overall figure for CONFISAL by the same percentage, it arrives at a figure of 400,000 workers represented by the federation.

Traditional points where the autonomous unions are strong are the state-controlled entities, where they are able to claim that 15 percent of the workers belong to their unions, with particular concentrations of strength such as in the INAIL [National Work Accident Insurance Institute], where they constitute the biggest trade union force, and the INPS, where CISAL has the third largest number of members. Then there are local situations such as the Apulia Aqueduct, where the autonomous unions have more than 2,000 members. In the hospitals, they have succeeded in combining representatives of several occupations (financial officers, administrative employees and mathematicians) and recently some technical personnel (radiology technicians and social assistants) together.

In the government UNSA sits at the negotiating table, but it does so because a decision in favor of "political peace" was made and not because the agreements are to be discussed again. Places where they are strong are some unions which make "concentrated" occupations their targets and represent the engineers or engine-shed chiefs of the railroads or the telegraph operators of the postal

and telegraph services. SNALS has about 100,000 representatives in schools (CGIL 140,000, CISL 200,000 and UIL 60,000), with areas of strength in secondary schools and kindergartens, while the CISL blocks their expansion in the elementary schools with the SINASCEL.

School Workers' Union

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 10 Jun 82 p 11

[Article by Gianfranco Benzi: "The Catch Phrases of SNALS"]

[Text] SNALS, which is the only typical union in CONFISAL and from which the majority of the delegates to the congress came, is one of the principal trade union organizations in the schools (however, the figures which are announced certainly cannot be assumed to depict the actual situation), although it does not have any specific structure of its own in the working environment, where it is identified by individual representatives.

This anomaly, which is typical of the government-employment sector, can be attributed to historical reasons--the organizational form taken by trade unions in the schools, with the exception of the elementary schools, until the late 1960's was that of autonomous unions--but it was also due to the ability of the group that was in charge, and to the fact that a favorable social and political situation existed. To be specific, the present group has managed to hold fast to the peculiarities of the group in a way that is not merely that of a unified body. It should be said, in fact, that an effort is being made--and the speech by Gallotta, the present secretary general, at the CONFISAL congress, bears witness to this--not only to give continuity and coherence to its various claims, which often contradict each other, but also to give them substance in a confused ideology which has three catch phrases as its theoretical supports.

The elevation of the individual (in contrast with the masses), which means, on the one hand, regarding the individual teachers as the central figures in educational activity, as against any socializing way of looking at pedagogical work, and, on the other hand, the defense of vested interests and seniority against all efforts at reforming the pension system and the wage structure; an alleged European dimension where trade union action is concerned, and hence the pursuit of better international connections; and the elimination of any sort of conflict between the respective claims of workers and institutions through a not-more-precisely-identified action of "reconciliation" with the law. Thus there is no doubt that, from time to time, these catch phrases, and the vagueness of the interpretations of which they are capable, serve to cover up the proposal of some component or other capable of causing agitation. However, the way that practice is also favored by the deficiencies of and the limitations to which federated action is subjected in the schools should be stressed. That is often attributable to a malicious political radicalism which is not supported by a real fabric of democracy and participation on the part of the workers, and so it ends up not favoring discussion and a comparison of the relative merits of the two sides but demagogic and confused agitation, instead. Moreover, SNALS is good at making use of the tools of mass information, as was demonstrated in the recent campaign on pensions.

However, it should be noted that, in the area of the schools, SNALS certainly does not have any problems connected with legitimizing its actions, which it, indeed, has repeatedly made use of--thanks to obliging behavior on the part of political moderates, too--in attempts to carry out programs calculated to slow down any compliance with demands for reform and change made by the federated school unions. Only think of its opposition to the signing of the important, precedent-setting part of the last labor agreement!

9258

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ELECTORAL LOSSES, FUTURE OF D'66 PARTY ANALYZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 5 Jun 82 pp 20-29

[Report by Wim Bavelaar and Coen Van Harten: "The Shards of the D'66"]

[Text] The skin color of D'66 [Democrats of 1966] is green, but little is left of the fresh, springlike image of the party. The D'66 has changed from a youth movement to a regular party. Terlouw has lost his charismatic radiance, even in his own circles. He himself does not even know whether he ever wants to be standard bearer again. Another of the select group at the top, Hans Van Mierlo, is being tossed hopelessly back and forth between his loyalty to the PvdA [Labor Party] and his pragmatic following. ELSEVIER carried out a series of interviews with D'66 leaders. Is the D'66 going to succumb to respectability, or is it going to fall victim to the political system it has always wanted to deflate?

The stormy rise of the D'66 must be explained primarily by the insurge of people who had a preference for a non-party, for a collection of intellectuals in their own time who embodied a reasonable policy and uncaringly attacked the webs of intrigue in the Hague with youthful elan. With the image of the "Reasonable Alternative," D'66 became a marketing success of the first magnitude.

And the D'66 entered the government. The Democrats were "degreened." Suddenly the party's Achilles heel became visible. The D'66 was always approached by the competing parties with extreme circumspection. If, indeed, they did not flirt unashamedly with the new phenomenon, at least it was considered unreasonable to exercise more than detail criticism of D'66. In all camps, from the left to the right, D'66 was felt to be almost a secret electoral threat, against which attack was anything but the best defense. Christian Democrats spoke in glowing terms of the Reasonable Alternative, and even in DE WAARHEID [the Dutch Communist Party newspaper], D'66 was treated gallantly. Jan Terlouw became the personification of D'66. An exemplary man, he was the embodiment of integrity. The last thing a sensible politician did was direct his criticism of the pragmatic opposition at Jan Terlouw, who was at least as popular as Johan Cruyff. Before the last Second Chamber elections, according to D'66 vice chairman Bob

Van De Bos, "a lot of attention was paid to our standard bearer. That is the strength and the weakness of the party. Terlouw was assigned a department, and thus disappeared from party politics. After that the spotlight was directed at the irresolute cabinet, at the strife between the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and the PvdA. And in that way, the D'66 suffered a publicity lull."

The only politician who directed his criticism of the Democrats at the untouchable Terlouw long before D'66 was called to governmental accountability was the then leader of the Liberals [VVD, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], Hans Wiegel. He took what might be called a ranging shot at Terlouw's personal downfall. But the D'66 had scarcely entered into the Van Agt-Den Uyl-Terlouw cabinet (which no one calls it) before Terlouw went from being the most spared to the most heavily criticized minister.

Terlouw had embarrassingly much difficulty with the new role. He reacted lovingly to flattery, but became irritated and sour when criticized, and thus his carefully built-up image was in tatters within a few weeks, the moths got into it. His party tried to protect him with the borrowed phrase: "Action on Damage to the Standard Bearer," a motto that had been coined for Van Agt, and thus the party made it easy for those who call D'66 a CDA without the C.

Rob Van Den Bos speaks of a "publicity lull," but the D'66 stayed in the news continuously. However, one report after another confirmed that the D'66 had become a fatally normal party instead of a club. D'66 proved not to be as worthy as Jan Terlouw appears. The newspaper reader was presented with a chronology of scandals like a serial. Bob Van Den Bos: "And they are going along happily with it. D'66, with its feeling for privacy, does not want to get into the discussion of these little affairs."

Of all parties, the Democrats were the most skilled at dealing with the press. Journalists and other media specialists have always been highly overrepresented in the party cadre. The D'66 was the first party to "present itself to the public," as the Americans would put it. "An advertizing party," the jealous outsiders called it. "But," says Bob Van Den Bos, "we are not an advertizing party at all. We are just about the only party without an advertizing agency." The difference between engaging in opposition and governing is shown everyday in the press. In the latest provincial government elections, the D'66 lost 30 percent, or, recalculated, 5 Chamber seats. And while charismatic leader Jan Terlouw's star dimmed, each public opinion poll fell more catastrophically than the last. The news was larded with "affairs."

The charming openness of the party proved to be the cause of less pleasant phenomena, such as "careerism" and "irresponsible opportunism." Within the "happily chaotic club," there were calls for more organization and such lacks as control and discipline. New members now enjoy the right to vote immediately, and to be elected to a representative body one need only report that he was not at fault during the war and have been a member of the party and paid his dues for 6 months. Even before a series of scandals came to light, the party leadership had been considering a new procedure for proposing candidates, one calling for more than individual responsibility on the part of the candidate himself to report relevant information.

In that spirit, the standard bearer in Assen decided to withdraw his candidacy when incautious manipulations with his employers' money threatened to become known. Other distressing occurrences involved the arsons of the emotionally unstable Haarlem delegation chairman Jaap Bregman, the "partial concealment" of the fraudulent activities of South Holland standard bearer Flip Pieters, the expulsion of that pair, the resignation of the national treasurer, Kees Klaver, who had become disappointed in the central committee, and the "localized disorder."

All parties are familiar with the phenomenon of internal squabbling every four years about the composition of the local candidates' lists, but in the D'66, as a side effect of the openness, the conflicts are played out on the street. Adventurers and other career hunters defend themselves formidably in that struggle. After much squabbling, the delegation leader in Alkmaar looked out for himself, and he now chairs a one-man delegation. In Holten, the standard bearer withdrew, after which there was no point in the election for the remaining three candidates. In Raalte, D'66 did not take part in the election, either, due to the deep enmity between numbers one and two on the list. The top leadership traveled from city to county to get a handle on local troubles. The big guns were not successful in that.

The D'66's image is not just in bad shape nationally. Locally, too, the party ran into lumps and bumps. That was why the campaign team employed the national big guns in the election campaign. That is an uncommon step, "but our members in the various communities needed support," according to chairman Jan Van Berkom.

And thus the harassed national leaders once again had to provide for a comprehensive local policy. The small scale problems had to be solved by the gentlemen who had lost all glamour behind the government table, who sulked like porcupines after their first confrontation with parliament. In Terlouw's first Chamber appearance as minister of economic affairs, the media rolled right over him en masse. Parliamentary criticism was spread thickly in public: Terlouw had allowed himself to be overruled by the powerful and conservative bulwark of bureaucrats in his department. Stimuli for a truly innovative industrial and export policy were sorely missed. It became clear painfully quickly to the three Democratic ministers and the three secretaries of state that governing is a matter of small margins, of compromises, particularly in a coalition which was so hard to put together. Quite a few members and voters had trouble with decisions by their cabinet members which they, had they been in the opposition, would have fought fiercely: Terlouw's agreement to allow oil drilling in Ameland to continue, his "gentlemen's agreement with the oil companies, Zeevalking's Ameliwaard adventure, Ineke Lambers' ocean dumping of radioactive waste. Defense minister Hans Van Mierlo was not subject to much criticism was not subjected to much criticism. Secretaries of state Dik (furthering exports) and Scheltema (justice) also stayed out of range, thanks to the fact that they had not distinguished themselves in any way. Terlouw, in the May issue of the party organ DEMOCRAT: "We are a party of long term solutions. Therefore we need not count on the applause of the moment."

Even in his own circles, Terlouw got little applause. In February 1981, 89 percent of D'66 voters still expressed confidence in the man who had breathed new

life into D'66. But a few months later, NIPO [the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion] figured that only 45 percent voiced support for Terlouw's actions. Thus D'66 has lost his cohesive force and so the dormant internal dis-sension is becoming increasingly manifest. Four delegation members have already been stigmatized as "dissident," and then there is also a "thinktank," a group of Democrats driven by serious discontent, established by former deputy chairman Cees Spijt. The group calls itself (R)appel ["Call Back"], highly significantly. [The original formation of D'66 was on the basis of an "Appel," an appeal or call.] This group wants to search for ways to regain the party's former elan, and does not want to sacrifice its image to "gray compromises," and with that, these Democrats are reflecting once again the core of their problem: D'66 is unsuccessful in displaying itself as a governing party. The party does not give a clear picture of itself, so competing parties manufacture the profile sketch of the D'66.

Years ago, Ed Nijpels of the VVD called the D'66 "a troublesome, but temporary phenomenon," and now he need only ascertain that the passing phenomenon is no longer so annoying. Since the cabinet crisis, Wiegel's accusation that the D'66 is only a sidecar of the PvdA is no longer so persuasive, but the VVD idea that any remaining liberals in D'66 really ought to be in the VVD.

From the left, it is easy to cast doubt on the progressivity of D'66. PPR [Political Party of the Radicals] chairman Wim De Boer: "Progressives can no longer expect anything from the D'66. The renovators of the 1960's have tasted power."

In that connection, the PvdA is employing the dagger thrust theory: the malleable Terlouw did talk a long time with Van Agt. Thus D'66 was successfully put on the defensive. Prominent D'66 members were not allowed the chance to make a showing, they were too busy removing false impressions. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst says of the "historic step," that of continuing to govern in coalition with the CDA, that this move "does not involve any course alteration," let alone that it is "a step in the direction of a CDA-VVD-D'66 coalition." Bob Van Den Bos found it necessary to explain that this choice "does not mean that we have moved to the right, that we find the CDA such a great party, or that the next time we will be able to enter a coalition with the VVD." And Hans Van Mierlo ("A shift to the right is an optical illusion") allowed his trial of conscience to be photographed when he wrestled at Brinkhorst's house with the question of whether continuing with his ministry was ethically in order.

But in the meantime, the quartet of dissidents fed the thought that "in this way," (meaning the rump cabinet of the CDA-D'66) "we might be spreading the carpet for a rightist cabinet." The profit that might have been gained from "dropping" the PvdA has not been realized. The party's independence (the right of the fourth stream to exist) could have been emphasized by this step, but instead, its very dependence has been demonstrated all the more dramatically. Without the PvdA, the D'66 seems to be rudderless. In so many words, the "social liberals" admit that their political possibilities are determined by the social democrats [Labor Party], who themselves are troubled by disunity. What is heard is "The PvdA must pull through."

Environmental Secretary Ineke Lambers Hacquebard: "We must wait and see what happens in the PvdA." Thus, Max Van Den Berg seems to have the future of D'66 in his hands. D'66 Senator Suzanne Bischoff: "Within the PvdA, we distinguish between a social democratic movement and--let us say--a movement which would rather join in with the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party]. I am convinced that the social democratic movement will be the winner."

[Question:] Does she have hopes for the New Realists?

[Answer:] "The Late Realists," jokes Second Chamber member Jan Veldhuizen.

Bob Van Den Bos puts it this way: "The PvdA was stuck with an over-optimistic election platform, and therefore did not have enough maneuvering space. That broke up the cabinet." And that also broke up D'66, with its dependence on the PvdA. In the battle of giants between the CDA and the PvdA, the refined, reasonable D'66 had no chance to make a showing. The party disappeared behind the clouds of dust raised by the turmoil of conflict between the CDA and PvdA. Its dilettantism had a disturbing effect while the party was in the opposition, but since it has been in the government, its lack of familiarity with the hard business of politics has been felt with a vengeance. Van Agt, who exploits his apparent amateurism (a Nijmegen professor who is staying on at the Hague and serving the national interest against his will) quite professionally, was never associated at all with the squabbling that went on under his regime. On the other hand, Terlouw and other Democratic ministers and secretaries seem to have simply spoiled while participating in the government. Jan Van Berkum: "Van Agt never showed himself to be particularly involved in this cabinet; apparently that had a beneficial effect in the elections."

Bob Van Den Bos: "A man like Terlouw is too proper to set himself up that way." Political craftsmanship seems common to the average D'66 member. As a result of that, the impression was created that D'66, surrounded by politically scarred and immunized ministers and secretaries from the CDA and PvdA, had been reduced to a will-less buffer party. Bob Van Den Bos: "If the PvdA and the CDA arrived at a D'66 position after negotiations, that does not mean that D'66 is a buffer party, but, on the contrary, that it is a leading party."

Suzanne Bischoff: "The only thing of which you can accuse the people in the cabinet is that they behaved too properly. They should have been able to have come out with their own proposals earlier, proposals in which the PvdA and the CDA eventually concurred after endless squabbling with one another." Jan Veldhuizen: There were quite a few D'66 elements in the coalition agreement. The only trouble is that there is no D'66 label on them." Bischoff: "I cannot see how, under the circumstances, you could have made a stronger showing without becoming improper." Lambers: "If you hold on to your own identity as tightly as that, then you cannot find your way out of the country's problems."

Jan Veldhuizen: "The functioning of this cabinet, the endless wavering on the Spring Bill, made it difficult for the D'66 to make a showing, even though the D'66 was clearly active in policy areas like exports, industry and defense. After all, we certainly did not want to make our showing through short term successes."

Bischoff: "D'66 intentionally did not choose pamphlet ideology, but for policy. And the people know well and good when something is merely a motto. We have that confidence in our electorate."

Van Den Bos: "It is difficult for the D'66 to participate in a demonstration: The streets are too narrow for our banners. We recognize a great deal of shading as a result of our careful consideration."

Van Berkomp: "There has never been anything like our platform in Dutch politics. It is like that Army Technical Manual and the Field Manual, it is so detailed. In the next few weeks we will make proposals for social economic and cultural developments, indeed, quite detailed proposals. I do not want any jingle like: 'D'66 Washes Whiter.'"

Van Den Bos: "Other parties do not so much have the electoral advantage of ideology but rather that of simplifying the picture. At this moment, all of the attention is being paid to the material factors in politics. In times like this it is difficult to show the D'66's face." In times of crisis, according to Van Den Bos, many voters seek "the comfort of the old ideologies. But both of them are seeming solutions. We employ an undogmatic approach, directed towards the practical. Sooner or later, the electorate will be convinced that this makes a greater contribution to solving precisely the problems of today. The CDA will have to own up eventually."

Van Berkomp: "In the coming Chamber elections, we will make a comeback. Courage is rewarded."

Van Den Bos: "In essence, we are remaining ourselves. We are not sacrificing our identity for publicity. Perhaps we are too refined." For information: "We have no tradition of personal attacks. We do not hold with that. That is part of our party culture."

Mrs. Lambers: "D'66 is not so cynical that we are only concerned with elections. I do not want to get too emotional about this, but we really are working from certain ideas, and we will not abandon them for electoral gains."

Suzanne Bischoff: "Cheap slogans are only good for the short term. A slogan like: 'Clear the rubbish!' [Puin ruim! the VVD slogan in the elections leading to the Van Agt-Wiegel cabinet] did work quite well, but the people could see that the rubbish was twice as deep just as soon as the rubbish clearers got in."

Jan Veldhuizen: "It is an underestimate of the voter to just come up with a slogan like 'Get your hands out of your sleeves.' [Roughly, 'Do something!'] A simplification of the facts like that is an insult to the voter."

Will D'66 succumb to propriety? In talks with any D'66 member at all, there is evidence of a deep confidence in the long term. Time will heal all electoral wounds. The D'66 will continue in its modest way to carry out its complicated, shaded mission. A simplification of that mission would not help

over the long term, so they say they know. Lambers: "And just suppose that that were the only way to get more than one seat. In that context, I would not want to be involved."

D'66 politicians have come to have a powerful aversion to "the figures." Fine D'66 policy undertakings were calculated away time after time by Van Der Stee. That, too, was a reason why the D'66 did not have a glamor role within the cabinet. Secretary of State Lambers: "It really seems as though the Netherlands consists solely of adding and subtracting these days, but despite all of those figures, yes, on the basis of those figures, we have packages of ideas. All of those figures are derived--even though important--but the figures are housework. After that, there is quite a bit that can and must be done. In the coming period, that must be the focal point: look to see what really can be done. Environmental policy, for example, is not out of fashion. Environmental policy was not halted during the discussion of the Spring Bill."

Van Veldhuizen explains why the voter saw so little of D'66: "While all kinds of nice things were in the pipeline, we were constantly confronted with new shortfalls."

Bischoff: "Van Der Stee is going to quit coming up constantly with new disappointments. He has promised us that."

Lambers: "The inclination to limit the problem to the budget deficit has induced a syndrome in a number of people."

In any event, the D'66 continues to represent itself as a well-mannered society of enlightened ladies and gentlemen, convinced that the thinking part of the nation will reward that stand. But how politically knowledgeable is the D'66's following? In the provincial government elections, a considerable part of the D'66 voters stayed home. Is that not a-political behavior? Veldhuizen: "If many D'66 voters lost sight of a total policy because of all of that talk about money and stayed home, is not that, too, a political stand?"

Lambers: "In the manner in which we approach the voter--not with short, three-word phrases, but instead taking the trouble really to explain things--that is the essence of D'66. That is our real nature. D'66 does not have a tradition rooted in dealing with power."

Veldhuizen: "As a governing party, you have to find a compromise. The continuity of policy leads to your finding that some of your predecessors' policies are on your agenda. That can have the effect that sometimes your own following wonders, 'What are those people doing?'"

Lambers: "That is all part of it if you want to set yourself up as an adult party. Some of the regular voters will and some of them will not follow you."

Nice people, those D'66ers. Mrs Lambers: "Every party has a booklet of political insults, but the D'66 does not consult its often. A slogan like, 'CDA without the C,' that is the kind of thing we do not do well."

Bischoff: "We scarcely set ourselves off against other parties, because we feel that we ourselves have a lot to offer."

Veldhuizen: "The manner in which Wiegel attacked Terlouw: do we have to participate in that? That may work over the short term, but you will not be able to sell it to the voter twice if you yourself have not achieved anything. You always have to be able to show yourself to the voter again with your head up."

How sensitive is the Dutch voter to the extreme nicety with which the D'66 approaches him?

Mrs Lambers: Not every voter has that make-up, but certainly an adequate number of people. Once again, you must not make a caricature of the voter." The D'66 looks more and more like the pre-war Freethinking Democrats, who likewise spoke with a certain disdain for the power of numbers.

Mrs Lambers-Hacquebard: "There is power in numbers, true, but if power is a means and not an end in itself, and if, then, we were to attain a similar extent as the Freethinking Democrats, all right, that is our historic lot. We must dare to face that test, and then, too, our function will remain that of a catalyst. Naturally, we would be happy to have a broader foundation, and I am counting on it, perhaps with fluctuations. It seems certain to me that we will never come out with more than 40 seats. (Later, she asked that it be noted she meant this ironically, ED) Perhaps that is our role after all: to approach the problems with finer instruments rather than with a bigger hammer. But then, the Netherlands is like a watch. You only get a watch going again with jewelers' tools."

6940

CSO: 3105

POLL CONFIRMS TREND OF DECLINING SUPPORT FOR PARTY LEADERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 May 82 p 6

[Article by Hakan Bergstrom: "Support for Adelson Has Declined"]

[Text] The electorate's support for Moderate Party leader Ulf Adelson declined during the last few months, over a period when he, among other things, went on a weekend trip to Rio de Janeiro.

According to the April poll by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls], 21 percent of the sample had confidence in Ulf Adelson. The corresponding figure for January had been 25 percent.

Ola Ullsten, Liberal Party, is still the leader receiving the least voter support. Only 5 percent of the electorate say that they strongly support the People's Party leader. Support for Ullsten has declined from 30 percent since 1978.

There has been a similar, if less drastic, decline for Prime Minister Thorbjorn. His popularity curve as party leader, however, has tended to level out. Some 10 percent of the electorate have great confidence in Falldin.

The support for Olf Palme has remained at the same level during recent months. Apparently, the political debate, often centered around the wage earners' funds, has not had any decisive effect of his popularity as a party leader. In April, 28 percent said that they had great confidence in Olof Palme.

Great confidence in Lars Werner, leader of the Leftwing Communist Party, was expressed by 9 percent of the electorate.

In the long run, it can be said that up to now 1982 polls have confirmed a continuing decline in support for the party leaders. At present, only 55 percent of the electorate declare strong support for at least one party leader. Last year the figure was 60 percent. Further back, in 1969, 89 percent of the electorate expressed strong support for one or another party leader.

TALKS WITH PROMINENT SOP FIGURES REVEAL LIKELY PALME ROLE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 May 82 p 6

[Ake Ekdahl: "If Social Democrats Win Fall Election, Palme Will Be the Spider in a Strong Power Network"]

[Text] The government will be controlled from a strong Prime Minister's Department, not from the Department of Finance. If the Social Democrats win the fall election, and Olof Palme gets to form his own government for the first time, his chancellery will become the leadership center that Palme wants. Ingvar Carlsson is one influential politician likely to be attached to this power group, as minister in charge of coordinating government policy.

Palme's claim to be in charge of government is not as self-evident as it may sound. Both Gunnar Strang and Gosta Bohman won considerable political leverage for themselves from their offices on Mynttorget next door. Strang's Budget Department became over the years a state within the state, and Bohman deliberately established himself as chief supervisor for Falldin.

The choice of Ingvar Carlsson as chief coordinator is hardly surprising. During the last years Palme has called upon him when he needed something done quickly and efficiently. This was the case with housing policy, energy policy and, lately, crisis policy.

This was revealed when DAGENS NYHETER talked to several of Palme's closest collaborators who knew about the prerequisites for forming a government.

It has often jokingly been said that Palme plans his government by tentatively writing the names in the soft sand of his summer house on Faro. There the wind and the waves can sweep away unsuccessful thoughts.

Half of the Members Gone

Today, most of the members of the cabinet which Palme inherited from Tage Erlander in 1969 have disappeared from the center of politics. Half of the Palme government rejected by the electorate in 1976 have retired from government affairs. Due to age, Gunnar Strang, 76, is not likely to have a comeback but will remain in the Riksdag as chairman. Ingemund Bengtsson, often singled out as the obvious choice for foreign minister, tells DAGENS NYHETER that he

would rather not occupy any position other than the one he has as spokesman in the Riksdag.

Sven Andersson, former foreign minister, and Lennart Geijer, former minister of justice, have left politics. Eric Holmquist, former minister of defense, and Sven Aspling, former minister of social affairs, will not be candidates in the next election.

Carl Lidblom, former minister of commerce, was appointed ambassador to Paris in May; Bengt Norling, former minister of communication, is governor in Karlstad; and Rune B. Johansson, former minister of industry, recently died. The following are left: Hans Gustafsson, now as minister of housing, Thage G. Peterson as minister of industry, Kjell-Olof Feldt as minister of finance, Anna-Grete Leijon as minister of labor, Lena Hjelm-Wallen as minister of education, Svante L. Lundquist as minister of agriculture and the only person besides Palme to return to his old job, Gertrud Sigurdson, and Bertil Zachrisson.

Palme must return with an almost completely new team. At least six women and some candidates from the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions have to be found. The various departments will remain as today, but there will be a reallocation of responsibilities. Possibly department of energy will be added; plans for such a department were ready as early as 1976.

Government Management Center

Palme will be in a strong position in relation to his ministers, being surrounded in his "management center" by associates with plenty of governmental experience. He will quickly resume the government routines.

Further, many of his associates believe he will have time to keep an eye on foreign policy. For that reason, it is expected that Palme will choose a "matching" foreign minister as Gertrud Sigurdson.

Many former ministers established their position in new areas while in opposition. They are now heading work or agitation groups in the party. Some have been mentioned above; another is Bertil Zachrisson as minister of communications.

Most frequently mentioned as minister candidates are Mats Hellstrom, expert on foreign aid and immigration affairs; Ulf Larsson, defense expert in Palme's report committee; Bert Lundin, former chairman of the Metal Workers Union; Rune Molin, secretary of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions and Social Democratic campaign leader in the referendum on nuclear power; and Sven Andersson, secretary of the Social Democratic Party and widely predicted to become the new minister of defense.

Not the First

He will not be the first party secretary to follow that pattern. This was also the case with Torsten Nilsson and Sven Andersson. The Social Democrats

emphasize that the party takes a strong stand on defense policy and Sven Andersson should be able to manage the difficult task. Incidentally, he had already been approached about such a position before the 1979 elections.

Other names mentioned are: Bo Holmberg, member of the county council in Harnosand and interested in modern health care, and Kurt Bostrom from Pitea, one of the so-called "deputies" (deputy leader of the parliamentary group), as well as Soren Mannheimer, jurist and member of the party committee. The women of the moment are Anita Gradin, revenue affairs among other things; Leni Bjorklund, County Council member, health services; Marianne Stalberg of Ustersund, women's equality; and Lily Hansson, from Umea, food administration.

9892

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WERNER: STRONG VPK COULD FREE SDP FROM NONSOCIALIST PRESSURE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Jun 82 p 6

[Report by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] "An election gain for the Communist Left Party [VPK] is needed for a leftist victory in the fall elections really to give Sweden a policy that breaks with the nonsocialist policy that has been followed since 1976."

Lars Werner, the VPK leader, said that in a speech to the hundred or so party delegates that assembled in Stockholm Saturday to adopt a campaign platform.

The VPK leader said that the VPK is the only party that can defend socialism against all attacks by the non-socialist parties during the election campaign.

"We have seen disturbing signs from certain quarters within the Social Democratic Party that they are thinking instead of compromising with the non-socialists. What will happen if they compromise on the waiting time [before health insurance coverage begins] and on unemployment insurance?"

Lars Werner drew a dark picture of the years of nonsocialist government, which have led among other things to 40,000 youths' being unemployed now and to general social disarmament. He said that for want of concrete proposals the non-socialist parties are now concentrating entirely on scaring people with wage-earner funds and socialism.

He said that it is not problem-free, but is important to explain to people how socialism will be built up in Sweden.

He pointed out that many today are disappointed in socialist régimes that have had a long time to build their social systems and still cannot provide people with their daily bread.

"But it is important to make it clear that this is not so in those countries because they have got too much socialism but because they have got too little," said Werner.

VPK Second Party

Werner pointed out that 30 percent of the Social Democratic voters named the VPK as their second party. That should be a good starting point for the Social Democrats, in case of a victory in the fall, to listen to the VPK's proposals, he said.

The election platform that is to be adopted Sunday [13 June] contains the program that the VPK has worked out for "the first hundred days" after a leftist victory in the fall. That in itself breaks the passivity that Werner says has prevailed for a long time.

The main points in it are a program for 100,000 new jobs, restrictions on foreign investments, guarantees of jobs or education for youth, a 39-hour work week as a step in the development toward a 6-hour work day for everybody, a rent freeze in 1983, and abolition of the MOMS [value-added tax] on basic foods.

"Tear up the decision to confiscate 1.5 billion kronor of the municipalities' tax revenues," said a resolution adopted by the election workers who conferred in the Riksdag building in Stockholm.

That measure was characterized as the culmination of a prolonged policy of weakening the economy of the municipalities and county administrations. The result has been crises in child care, public health, and care of the aged.

With that policy the government is increasing the burdens of the crisis that fall upon families with children, retirees, and persons with low incomes, according to the resolution.

8815

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NEW LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPON PROFILED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jul 82 pp 26-29

[Article by Klaus F. Minberg: "The New Model 3 Bazooka--an Effective Weapon Against Tanks"]

[Text] Advances in the development of the battletank and the increasing strength of armor protection against hollow charges and inertial projectiles necessitate constant performance increases in all AT weapons. A special group of problems arises here with respect to light, short-range AT weapons as a widely used and cost-effective means for AT defense. Here it is impossible to exceed certain specific limits, on the one hand, with respect to the weight, dimensions, and noise development whereas on the other hand it is necessary to require high performance. The limits of what is feasible have been reached for the most part and now it is important to find clever optimization solutions in order to be able to meet these requirements. Design manager Klaus F. Minberg a desk officer in the Armaments Department of the Defense Ministry, in the following presents the Model 3 Bazooka, now being developed by Dynamit Nobel AG [Incorporated], as a suitable solution. Like the Lanze light bazooka, currently introduced, it works according to the Davis cannon principle and therefore can also be fired from closed rooms, which is a main requirement.

Tactical Requirements

To replace the hand-fired AT weapons currently in use in the Federal Armed Forces but no longer meeting future requirements, that is,

The 44-mm light bazooka called Lanze (warhead caliber 67 mm),

As well as the 84-mm Carl Gustav AT rifle (warhead caliber 84 mm),

The German requester demands a one-man weapon:

With a high destruction probability against present and future battle tanks also when fired frontally,

Which can be fired from closed rooms and

Whose price is so low that it can be used widely on the battlefield.

In addition to these primary requirements, we have the following:

At a given hit probability, the range should be 300 m against moving and 400 m against stationary targets;

The weight of the entire system must not exceed 12 kg and the length of the weapon must not exceed 1.20 m when carried and 1.30 m when ready to fire;

It should be an easily handled weapon for one time use or at least it should be a partly discardable weapon;

It must be possible rapidly to make the weapon ready again for firing for a follow up round and the training requirement must be small in order in this way likewise to guarantee a large number of these weapons on the battlefield.

In spite of the concessions to the weight of the system and the range--which, compared to the current Lanze, cannot meet any higher requirements--it was by no means easy to meet these requirements. The new weapons development which became known in recent times and which involved similar weapons can in each case meet only part of those requirements. None of the weapons currently in use or available in the near future can meet the main requirements in terms of the price so that it was necessary in 1978 to start a new development in the FRG which is to be available as of 1985. West Germany's military-geographic situation does not permit a decline in the requirements that have been set up; instead it is bound to be in the interest of the requester to make sure that the soldier who, in case of war, will be exposed to a massive tank threat in the very front line will also have an effective and reliable weapon under those conditions if tanks have broken through the defense put up by long-range weapons and penetrate friendly positions.

Concept Selection

Firing from closed rooms (buildings, basements, ruins, shelters) constitutes a special hitherto unparalleled requirement--because it could not be met until now--which in the future assumes special significance because of the increasing urban growth in the Central European battlefield. This is why this requirement was essentially decisive for the design of this new development.

Another feature concerning concept selection was given by the current threat which assumed a big warhead caliber (comparable to the tank gun) with a correspondingly heavy explosive weight [mass]. Besides, we can expect armor protection to be further improved on the basis of new technologies so that a subsequent increase in the penetration performance through increase in the

caliber would have to be taken into consideration at the right time. Basically we have four principles for the design of a light AT weapon whose decisive features will now be described briefly for better overall understanding.

Rocket Principle (U.S. LAW M 72)

The new, almost exclusively applied rocket principle offers the great advantage that the weapon as such, the launcher tube, because of the small inside pressures in the tube, can be made in a very simple manner, with a weight saving and without any special requirements in terms of the raw material to be used. It is particularly suitable for a so-called throwaway weapon whose firing part is thrown away only after firing, that is to say, the gunner is no longer weighted down with parts of a weapon that has already been fired. The system can be used quickly and a follow up round is possible very quickly, assuming another weapon is available. Of course, the firing signature (report, smoke, flash, dust stirred up) is very strong. The ratio between the weight of the system and the warhead caliber is at an optimum here and the absence of recoil is already a part of the system and its design. The rocket principle is therefore preferred. The well-timed burnout of the propellant charge is a problem to some extent; it must have taken place before the projectile has left the tube because otherwise the gunner can be hit by the gas jet. The tube had to be made relatively long already for safety reasons.

Jet-Gun Principle (Carl Gustaf)

The jet-gun principle develops high inside pressure stresses within the tube. The absence of recoil is achieved in that the propellant gases, which come out of a nozzle to the rear--as in the case of a rocket--generate a moment running against the recoil impulse. The jet [nozzle] gun is heavy and besides it is relatively unsuitable as a throwaway weapon because it is expensive to make. As in the case of the rocket principle, the firing signature is strong and the tube must, over its entire length, have an inside diameter corresponding to the warhead caliber. Because of that, it is possible to design only an extremely awkward weapon in view of the warhead calibers required today or we would have to accept a reduction the required effect.

Davis Gun Principle (Lanze)

In the Davis gun principle, to attain the absence of recoil, a counter mass, corresponding to the mass of the projectile, is expelled to the rear, out of the firing tube (cancellation of impulses). The disadvantage of this principle is the required counter mass which, in combination with the tube, that is to be designed for the inside pressure, contributes to a comparable heavier system weight. This is to have the following advantages:

The warhead caliber can be larger than the inside diameter of the tube (easily handled weapon, possibility of subsequent caliber increase);

Small propellant quantity required (small gas volume).

These advantages make this system best suited for meeting the high requirements of a hand-fired AT weapon.

Crossbow Principle

The crossbow principle, as a modified Davis gun principle, in addition features two pistons which expel the projectile and the countermass out of the firing tube and which are intercepted at the particular end of the tube so that the propellant gases can be trapped in the tube before they can come out. Because of that, the signature is extremely small. The Crossbow available so far had a tube inside diameter which was as large as the caliber. But one might just as well visualize that such a weapon might have a warhead caliber that is bigger than the inside diameter of the tube (see the Jupiter concept of the Luchaire Company).

In this way, the crossbow principle actually represents the optimum solution concerning firing from closed rooms. The design with the two systems and the control of the forces developing during the braking of these pistons however is not quite uncritical and we therefore still require intensive development work here before such a weapon will be available. We can also expect that the weight of the system will be increased because of the oversized warhead caliber and because the price will definitely be higher than the price of a comparable weapon based on the Davis gun principle with comparable effect. Considering the abovementioned advantages and disadvantages and the established realization that one can quickly make a simple and low-cost weapon based on the Davis gun principle which will also meet the requirements for high effectiveness and firing from closed rooms, the choice fell to a concept to be developed which can be described in simple words as a modified 44-mm Lanze bazooka.

Description of Weapon

The Model 3 bazooka consists of the following:

The launch tube with an inside diameter of 60 mm,

The projectile with fuze, auxiliary motor and fins,

The propellant charge with propellant igniter,

The countermass,

The firing mechanism with the pistol grip, the shoulder support, and the forward handle and

The optical sight as a part of the firing massive.

The launch tube is spun from GFK (glass-fiber-reinforced plastic) and has an inside liner made of aluminum. In this launch tube (which is the throwaway part), we have the projectile, the propellant charge with the propellant charge igniter, and the countermass. On this so-called ammunition part, the firing mechanism is now attached together with the sights in a simple manner according to the current design.

The firing mechanism is designed as a reusable weapons part, that is to say, a second round requires the off-flanging and re-flanging of this weapons part which takes little time. It is delivered in a certain numerical ratio with the ammunition parts. In this way it is possible to keep the costs particularly low without having to forgo safety or precision. Basically however it is also possible to visualize a simple throwaway design which would still make the entire weapon a one time weapon at acceptable cost.

To achieve a small firing signature and a still acceptable system weight, it was necessary to keep the initial velocity of the projectile relatively low at 165 m/sec. In order nevertheless to guarantee an adequately stretched-out trajectory (beaten zone) and short flying time, it became necessary to provide auxiliary drive (ignition about 10 m after leaving the muzzle) which would accelerate the projectile on the trajectory up to about 250 m/sec. The projectile is stabilized in flight by an attachable set of fins. To achieve adequate standoff, the warhead is provided with an extractable prong.

Ignition takes place in the usual manner by means of a firing pin and, if there should be an ignition failure, a redundancy ignition is present and it goes into action automatically after a short time delay. The ammunition can be ignited only after the firing mechanism has been attached and it is necessarily on safe so long as the pistol grip is retracted. Only after the pistol grip has been extended can the safety be removed by switching the safety flap around in a manner known from the G-3 rifle. By once again folding the pistol grip in, the safety flap is necessarily returned to the "safe" position if the weapon had not been secured beforehand. An additional drop safety prevents the unwanted ignition of the weapon if the unsecured weapon should be dropped.

The target sight contains a graduated plate which is illuminated by means of a twilight accessory and which showed both range (elevation) and lead target markers corresponding to the target's speed. To facilitate firing with both eyes, work is being done on the development of a sight with a 1:1 image (as in the case of G-11 rifle).

Firing from closed rooms is made possible by the following:

The small volume of gas developing (only a fraction of that which would be required in a weapon based on the rocket principle or the jet [nozzle] gun principle for function reasons);

The gas jet control, in a such manner that the major portion of the propellant gases will leave the weapon through the muzzle;

The design of the counter mass, in a such a way that there is a slight decomposition after leaving the tube.

The prerequisite for firing from closed rooms in this weapon of course is also that the muzzle is outside the room during firing. In this way we prevent an overpressure or a detonation pressure from building up in the

room which primarily or secondarily can wound the gunner. Other weapon designs, apart from the crossbow design, do not permit firing from closed rooms.

The low price which seems indicated for this system is particularly due to the purely conventional technology which has an effect especially in the propellant charge design and the small required propellant quantities as well as the reusability of the reasonably priced firing mechanism and sight.

Training

Only a few hours will be required for training, that is to say, the soldier is primarily instructed in handling the weapon to make it ready for firing and in aiming it correctly. For that and for training in the field we will presumably have available a practice weapon which will be identical in terms of weight, dimensions, and handling. For firing practice, plans call for a subcaliber firing instrument with the weapons and weapons firing characteristics as in the original weapon so that only a few live rounds have to be fired during training.

Maintenance and repair are planned neither for the ammunition, nor for the reusable firing mechanism because both of them are used up.

Ammunition Types

As for ammunition types, only a hollow-charge projectile has so far been planned to engage battle tanks. It is basically however conceivable that flare ammunition might some day be available for battlefield illumination. The same applies to additional types of ammunition which can be used in a special way in engaging the tank.

Heavier Weight but Practically Usable

Because of the low price, which comes to only half or one-third of the known price of other, newly-developed, lighter AT hand weapon systems, because of the high destruction probability, the simple handling, and possibility of firing from closed rooms, the Model 3 bazooka will probably be viewed with great interest.

Presumably however other nations will have a negative opinion regarding the relatively heavy weight because we can detect a general trend toward lighter weapons. A lighter weight however would have to be exchanged against reduced effectiveness or limited usefulness. This is especially why the German requester is ready to accept a heavier system which on the other hand however is roughly identical to the currently used 44-mm Lanze bazooka in the loaded state.

From the German viewpoint it is to be preferred that the soldier will be exposed to a heavier load rather than to giving him a weapon which he might possibly not fire because he knows that his chances of destroying a tank are poor--a tank to which he reveals his position by firing his weapon.

In a similar manner it would be wrong to require greater range if this would again have to be swapped against a part of the destruction probability or the possibility of firing from closed rooms. A reduction in requirements especially in this weapons system--which has reached the limits of that which is feasible--can mean something extra in terms of action readiness and safety.

Technical Data

Weight of weapon ready to fire: 12 kg;
Length of weapon ready to fire: 1.2 m;
Weight of projectile: 3.6 kg;
Weight of firing unit with sights: 1.75 kg;
Warhead diameter (can be increased in case of need): 110 mm;
Range: 300 m for moving targets, 400 m for stationary targets;
Initial projectile velocity v_0 : 165 m/sec;
Maximum projectile velocity: 250 m/sec;
Apex of trajectory (300 m): 2.6 m;
Flying time (300 m): 1.55 sec;
Safety interval behind weapon (personnel): 10 m
Penetration performance adequate against all current known battle tanks.

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